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Abstract
The factors explaining the lack of participation and engagement by Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism (DSU) have been the subject 
of much academic discourse. This paper posits the existence of a new factor that will inform and 
expand this discourse. The paper examines the pursuit of Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) by 
LDCs during the GATT era, positing that S&D became a key driver of LDC policy during this period. It 
is argued that during the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, this S&D-driven policy led the LDCs to 
seek a bespoke LDC dispute settlement system extraneous to, and separate from, the DSU mechanism 
agreed upon by the vast majority of GATT contracting parties. This paper concludes that the clearly 
espoused desire of LDCs neither to participate in nor to be associated the DSU, coupled with their 
clearly expressed requests for a bespoke LDC-only dispute settlement mechanism; together provide a 
powerful new reason why LDCs have not more actively engaged with the DSU.
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2مقالة بحثية
المعاملة الخاصة التفضيلية: عامل جديد لتفسير التزام الدول القل 
تطوًرا بنظام تسوية النزاعات لمنظمة التجارة العالمية
رونالد ويل�ش
باحث في القانون، جامعة �ضتراثكلايد ومحا�ضر في القانون الدولي، بوليتكنك البحرين
hb.cinhcetylop@hslew.dlanoR
ku.ca.htarts@hslew.dlanoR
ملخص
ُتعد العوامل التي تف�ضر عدم م�ضاركة والتزام الدول الأقل تطوًرا في اآلية ت�ضوية النزاعات لمنظمة التجارة الدولية 
مو�ضوع جدل القطاع الأكاديمي. تقدم هذه الدرا�ضة عامًلا جديًدا لتغذية وتو�ضيع هذا الجدل. كما اأنها تقّيم موا�ضلة هذه 
الدول للمعاملة الخا�ضة التف�ضيلية في زمن التفاقية العامة للتعريفات الجمركية والتجارة، باعتبارها اأ�ضا�س �ضيا�ضتها. 
وخلال جولة اأوروغواي لتفاقيات التجارة، دفعت هذه ال�ضيا�ضة الدول الأقل تطوًرا للبحث عن نظام مو�ضى عليه لت�ضوية 
النزاعات، ومنف�ضل عن اآلية ت�ضوية النزاعات المتفق عليها من قبل اأكثرية اأطراف التفاقية العامة للتعريفات الجمركية 
والتجارة. وتخل�س هذه الدرا�ضة برغبة الدول الأقل تطوًرا في عدم الم�ضاركة اأو الن�ضمام اإلى اآلية ت�ضوية النزاعات، 
بالإ�ضافة اإلى المطالبة باآلية لت�ضوية النزاعات مو�ضى عليها فقط لهذه الدول، مما يو�ضح �ضبب عدم التزام هذه الأخيرة 
باآلية ت�ضوية النزاعات.
الكلمات المفتاحية: الدول الأقل تطوًرا، المعاملة الخا�ضة التف�ضيلية، التفاقية العامة للتعريفات الجمركية 
والتجارة، منظمة التجارة الدولية، جولة اأوروغواي، تفاهم ت�ضوية النزاعات
SSECCA NEPO
 snommoC evitaerC eht fo smret eht rednu detubirtsid elcitra ssecca nepo na si sihT .sserP UQ eesnecil ,hsleW 9102 ©
 dedivorp ,muidem yna ni noitcudorper dna noitubirtsid ,esu detcirtsernu stimrep hcihw ,0.4 YB CC esnecil noitubirttA
.detic ylreporp si krow lanigiro eht
 htiw tnemegagnE CDL gninialpxE rotcaF weN A :tnemtaerT laitnereffiD dna laicepS“ ,.R hsleW :sa elcitra siht etiC
3&2 eussI ,8102 emuloV ,waL fo weiveR lanoitanretnI ,”?metsyS tnemeltteS etupsiD OTW eht
7102 hcraM 81 :dettimbuS
7102 yluJ 4 :detpeccA
3Introduction
The concept of a “Least Developed Country” (LDC) originated in discussions by members of the United 
Nations1 (U.N.) that took place during the 1960s and 1970s.2 These discussions resulted in the creation of 
LDCs as a separate and distinct U.N. category by the U.N. General Assembly in 1971.3 Within the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) arena,4 LDCs were formally recognised by the Tokyo Declaration 
of 1973,5 though Hawthorne notes evidence of LDC recognition within the GATT council minutes of 1971.6 
The economic development of countries relies in part on their ability to trade with each other;7 the 
conduct of this international trade has come to be based upon a set of rules, first administered by the 
GATT and now by its successor the WTO.8 Under both administrations, disputes between member states 
about the application of these rules were to be settled through a mutually-agreed dispute settlement 
system. Under the WTO, this dispute settlement system is known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU). 9 
For the most part, however, LDCs have failed to fully avail themselves of the DSU.10 The situation has persisted 
despite abundant potential disputes involving infringement of LDC trading rights.11 As a consequence of their 
failure to seek remediation of these infringements, the ability of LDCs to trade internationally has been 
impaired and further, their economic development impeded.12 
1- For a list of the U.N. member states and their dates of admission, see United Nations, Member States, http://www.un.org/
en/members (last visited 2 March 2016).
2- Helen Hawthorne, Least Developed Countries and the WTO: Special Treatment in Trade 23 (2013); Djalita Fialho, Altruism 
but not Quite: The genesis of the least developed country (LDC) category, 33 Third World Q. 751, 753 (2012).  
3- G.A. Res. 2768 (XXVI), Identification of the Least Developed Countries among the Developing Countries (18 Nov. 1971), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc2/gares2768xxvi.pdf.
4- The original GATT, which covered international trading in goods, was signed in 1947. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter, 
GATT]. In 1994, the GATT was retained, along with amendments made to it over the years, as part of the Uruguay Rounds 
that also led to the creation of the World Trade Organization. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) 
[hereinafter GATT 1994], https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm; see also World Trade Organization, 
Understanding the WTO: Basics-The Uruguay Round, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm 
(last visited 28 Nov. 2017) [hereinafter Understanding the WTO].
5- General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Sept. 1973, WTO Doc. WT/MIN (73) W/1 at 6 (1973) 
[hereinafter, 1973 Ministerial Declaration].
6- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 45 (citing GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 9 Nov. 1971, C/M/74, 
at 12-13(1971) [hereinafter GATT Council Minutes]), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90430028.pdf).
7- See Ashford C. Chea, Sub-Saharan Africa and Global Trade: What Sub-Saharan Africa Needs to Do to Maximize the Benefits 
from Global Trade Integration, Increase Economic Growth and Reduce Poverty, 2 Int’l J. Acad. Res. in Bus. & Soc. Sci. 
360 (2012), http://www.hrmars.com/admin/pics/726.pdf; Michael R. Mullen et al., The Effects of International Trade on 
Economic Growth and Meeting Basic Human Needs 15 J. Global Marketing 31 (2001).
8- See discussion infra Section 1.2.
9- Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-
dsu.pdf [hereinafter DSU]. 
10- Ronald Cullen Kerr Welsh, Frustration through Futility: Least developed countries and the WTO’s settlement of disputes, 
2016 Int’l Rev. L. 1, 8, http://www.qscience.com/doi/abs/10.5339/irl.2016.iit.1.
11- Victor Mosoti, Does Africa Need the WTO Dispute Settlement System?, in Towards A Development-Supportive Dispute 
Settlement System in the WTO 67, 79 (Geneva: Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Resource Paper No. 5, March 2003), 
https://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/dsu_2003.pdf.
12- See Welsh, supra note 10, at 8.
4An abundance of academic discourse has addressed why LDCs have avoided using the DSU.1 The traditional 
view, as expressed by Van den Bossche and Gathii, is that it has resulted from the confluence of complex inter-
related barriers which LDCs face, barriers stemming in large part from financial and organisational structural 
weaknesses endemic to LDCs.2 Yet, despite the extensive analyses, one key, overarching factor has thus far 
never been discussed. This factor may necessitate a re-appraisal of the accepted academic discourse.
Primary source materials assessed for this paper provide clear evidence that, during the GATT negotiations 
that led to the creation of the DSU, the LDCs proposed that a dispute settlement system be created 
specifically for them. Thus, LDCs collectively sought to opt out of the mainstream dispute settlement 
system. The materials also show that this proposal was premised upon the norm of Special and Differential 
Treatment (S&D), an initially limited approach that developed into a strategic policy objective of LDCs. 
In pursuit of their S&D objectives, LDCs sought to extend the application of S&D into new policy areas 
through a process of expansion and natural progression, culminating in their opt-out proposal for dispute 
settlement.
The LDC opt-out proposal has hitherto never been examined within the body of academic discourse 
seeking to explain LDC non-engagement with the DSU. Using primary source materials, this paper adds a 
new dimension to this discourse. 
Structure
This paper is comprised of five sections, each of which explores LDC engagement with, and their application 
of, different facets of S&D. 
The first section will discuss what is meant by the term S&D, the causal factors underlying this treatment 
and the S&D principles adopted during the 19481995- GATT era.
The second section considers how S&D, which was designed primarily to take account of purely economic 
issues arising during the course of trade negotiations, was progressively expanded into a broader policy 
tool deployed by LDCs. This tool ultimately became widely used to address an increasing number of non-
economic issues unrelated to specific trade negotiations. 
1- See, e.g., Mosoti, supra note 11, at 69 et seq.; Roderick Abbott, Are Developing Countries Deterred from Using the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System?: Participation of Developing Countries in the DSM in the years 19952005-, 1 (ECIPE 
Working Paper No.1, 2007), http://www.ecipe.org/media/publication_pdfs/are-developing-countries-deterred-from-
using-the-wto-dispute-settlement-system.pdf; Amin Alavi, African Countries and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
25 Dev. Pol’y Rev. 25 (2007), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2007.00358.x/epdf; Jan Bohanes & 
Fernanda Garza, Going Beyond Stereotypes: Participation of Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement, 4 Trade L. 
& Rev. 45 (2012), http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/traladpt4&section=7; Marco 
Bronckers & Freya Baetens, Reconsidering financial remedies in WTO dispute settlement, 16 J. Int’l Econ. L. 281 (2013); 
Marc L. Busch, Eric Reinhardt & Gregory Shaffer, Does legal capacity matter? A survey of WTO members, 8 World Trade 
Rev. 559 (2009); Hunter Nottage, Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System (Global Econ. Governance 
Programme, Working Paper 2009/47, Jan. 2009), http://geg-test.nsms.ox.ac.uk/sites/geg/files/Nottage_GEG%20WP%20
2009_47.pdf [hereinafter Nottage, Developing Countries]; Hakan Nordström & Gregory Shaffer, Access to justice in the 
World Trade Organization: A case for a small claims procedure?, 7 World Trade Rev. 587 (2008), http://journals.cambridge.
org/abstract_S1474745608003996; Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing 
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in Towards A Development-Supportive Dispute Settlement 
System in the WTO 1 (Geneva: Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Resource Paper No. 5, Mar. 2003), https://www.
ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/dsu_2003.pdf; Asif Qureshi, Interpreting WTO Agreements for the Development Objective, 
in Towards A Development-Supportive Dispute Settlement System in the WTO 89 (Geneva: Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable 
Dev., Resource Paper No. 5, Mar. 2003), https://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/dsu_2003.pdf.\\uc0\\u8216{}African 
Countries and the WTO\\uc0\\u8217{}s Dispute Settlement Mechanism\\uc0\\u8217{} (2007
2- Peter Van den Bossche & James Gathii, Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System by LDCs and LICs: Hands-On Introduction 
and Simulation Exercise 21 (Trade Pol’y Training Ctr. in Africa Paper, 2013), http://new.trapca.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/TWP1304-Use-of-the-WTO-Dispute-Settlement-System-by-LDCs-and-LICs.pdf.
5The third section will show how S&D, as one of the key drivers of LDC governmental policy, influenced 
both negotiating objectives and strategies in the Uruguay Round negotiations, specifically those related 
to the DSU. It will describe how, when faced with draft DSU proposals that commanded the overwhelming 
support of WTO members (both developed and developing), LDCs used S&D as the purveyor of their policy 
to opt out of the DSU. 
The fourth section explores the underpinnings of the LDC opt-out proposal, positing that its terms clearly 
demonstrate that LDCs unanimously rejected the methodology underpinning the DSU. This section 
demonstrates that the opt-out proposal was the product of a deeply held belief that LDCs should be given 
and expected to benefit from S&D. Moreover, as a result of the rejection of their S&D-based proposal, 
LDCs were left with a dispute settlement system they neither wanted nor in a sense agreed to. This result 
is a powerful, newly recognized reason why LDCs do not engage with the DSU, providing not only a unique 
perspective on the topic but also a vital contribution to the quest to understand LDC non-engagement.
The fifth section will draw together the preceding sections, providing both an overview and a summary of 
each. In addition to providing a conclusion to the paper, this section will assess the likelihood of a bespoke 
dispute settlement system being created specifically for LDCs at some future point and briefly consider 
the possible options for change. 
. 1 The origins and underpinnings of S&D
The central hypothesis of this paper is that S&D became the default negotiation policy pursued by 
LDCs specifically in relation to the DSU, and it was this policy that underpinned the opt-out proposal. 
To understand why and how this situation arose, it is necessary to understand not only the origins of 
S&D but also how its application evolved, changed and was adopted as the default policy doctrine 
pursued by LDCs during the Uruguay Round negotiations.
The 1979 Tokyo Declaration, “Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries”1 (informally known, and in this article referred to, as the 
Enabling Clause) gave rise to the abbreviated term for Special and Differential Treatment, S&D. 
Furthermore, the Enabling Clause formally recognised LDCs as a separate subset of the developing 
countries2 and incorporated the term S&D into the multilateral trading system.3 
. 1.1 The antecedents of S&D
The origins and rationale underpinning S&D considerably pre-date the Tokyo Declaration, perhaps 
as early as right after the end of World War II. Hudec argues that the 19461948- post-war GATT-
1- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation 
of Developing Countries; GATT Doc. L/4903 (3 Dec. 1979), at 3, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/L4999/4903.PDF 
[hereinafter “the Enabling Clause”]
2- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 45; 1973 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5. 
3- See Bernard Hoekman, Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 
8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 405, 405 (2005); Tony Heron, Pathways from Preferential Trade: The Politics of Trade Adjustment in 
Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific 9, 24 (2013); Bernard Hoekman, Constantine Michalopoulos & L. Alan Winter, Special 
and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the WTO: Moving Forward after Cancún, 27 The World Econ. 481, 
482 (2004), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0378-5920.2004.00610.x/full; Bernard M. Hoekman & Michel M. 
Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System 537 (3d ed. 2009); Constantine Michalopoulos, The role of 
special differential treatment for developing countries in GATT and the World Trade Organization 25, 41 (The World 
Bank, Pol’y Res. Paper No. WPS 2388, 31 July 2000) [hereinafter Michalopoulos, Special Differential Treatment]; Mari 
Pangestu, Special and Differential Treatment in the Millennium: Special for Whom and How Different?, 23 The World 
Econ. 1285, 1288 (2000), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9701.00330/abstract; John Whalley, Special 
and Differential Treatment in the Millennium Round, 22 The World Econ. 1065, 3 (1999) [hereinafter Whalley, Special and 
Differential Treatment]; 1973 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 10.
6ITO negotiations cast the future of international trade policy,1 with the rules governing that 
policy being  premised exclusively upon there being a single set of rules that were to be applied 
to all countries, developing or otherwise.2 But Hawthorne notes that the antecedents of S&D are 
to be found within these original GATT negotiations and in the S&D provisions contained within 
the ill-fated International Trade Organisation (ITO) Charter,3 which never came into force.4
The demise of the ITO thus left the GATT as the primary regulatory mechanism governing world 
trade.5 Nevertheless, some of the S&D provisions of the ITO6 were incorporated into GATT Article 
XVIII.7 As Hudec acknowledges, the GATT included the principle that the conditions faced by 
developing countries meant they should be accorded a degree of latitude and special dispensation 
from the GATT legal discipline.8 In other words, developing countries merited some form of S&D, 
an idea that Ansong has identified as the “primordial” roots of S&D .9 
. 1.2 The GATT Review Session 1955-1954
The next major milestone in the development of S&D was the GATT 19541955- Review Session 
(the GATT Review),10 the outcome of which many writers11 cite as representing the genesis of 
S&D.12 At this meeting, there was a “general consensus” that the GATT should be formalised into 
an organisation promoting global trade rules.13 Moreover, “the special problems of countries in 
1- Robert E Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System 27 (2014) (Reissued first edition with a new Introduction 
by J. Michael Finger). 
2- Id. at 28.
3- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 40.
4- Hudec, supra note 18, at 33; T.N. Srinivasan, Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System: From the GATT to 
the Uruguay Round and the Future 11 (2000); Alex Ansong, Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the 
GATT/WTO: Past, Present, Future 9 (2012); Peter Van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization 78 (3d ed. 2013).{\\i{}The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization} (Cambridge University Press 2013
5- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 40.
6- U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, 21, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (12 Nov. 1947 - 
24 Mar. 1948), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf.
7- Srinivasan, supra note 21, at 23.Colo.”,”number-of-pages”:”160”,”edition”:”New edition edition”,”source”:”Amazon”,
”event-place”:”Boulder, Colo.”,”abstract”:”In this work, T.N. Srinivasan evaluates the interaction between developing 
countries and the multilateral trading system since World War II and describes the achievements and failures of the Uruguay 
Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in that context. Among other issues, the author addresses possible linkages 
between trade policies and environmental and labor standards, the opportunities and threats regionalism poses to a global 
trading system, and the consequences of cooperation between the World Trade Organization (WTO
8- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 41; Hudec, supra note 188, at 33.
9- Ansong, supra note 21, at 10.
10- General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade, The Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties and the Review of the GATT, GATT 
Doc. MGT/27/54 (25 Oct. 1954).
11- See, e.g., Michalopoulos, Special Differential Treatment, supra note 17, at 4; Ansong, supra note 21, at 25; WTO Law 
and Developing Countries 17 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., Columbia Studies in WTO Law & Pol’y 2007) 
[hereinafter WTO Law]; Constantine Michalopoulos, Developing Countries in the WTO 25 (2001); Hunter Nottage, Trade 
and Competition in the WTO: Pondering the Applicability of Special and Differential Treatment, 6 J. Int’l Econ. L. 23, 25 
(2003) [hereinafter Nottage, Trade and Competition]; Juliana Peixoto Batista, Flexibilities for Developing Countries in 
the DOHA Round as À La Carte Special and Differential Treatment; Retracing the Uruguay Steps?, 1 Cadernos PROLAM/
USP 164, 169 (2010), http://www.revistas.usp.br/prolam/article/download/82411/85389.
12- Note: Whalley argues that S&D did not evolve until the 1960s, with the GATT Review being simply an attempt to incorporate the 
concerns of developing countries into the GATT system. See Whalley, Special and Differential Treatment, supra note 17, at 3.
13- Press Release, Information Centre, European Office of the United Nations, Geneva, GATT Intersessional Committee: 
Meeting Concluded, GATT Doc. GATT/162 (4 Aug. 1954), at 1, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/GATT/162.PDF.
7less advanced stages of development were acknowledged as one of the most important elements 
in the Review Session.”1 
At time of the GATT Review, LDCs per se had not been formally defined as a group. Nevertheless, 
careful analysis of the GATT documents has made it possible to identify those countries that 
subsequently were defined as LDCs, as well as the part they played in the review process. 
Therefore, to promote clarity, the term LDCs will be used throughout the discussion. 
Through the documents relating to the GATT Review, the voices and concerns of LDCs can be 
clearly heard. For example, Burma (now the LDC Myanmar) argued inter alia that if the GATT was 
not modified to take account of their special circumstances this would harm and be prejudicial 
to their economic development.2 
The Haitian representative was somewhat more forthright about the inclusion of formal S&D 
provisions into the GATT, stating that “concrete facts point to the conclusion that it is right to 
give special consideration to the particular situation of countries in course of development.”3 
In relation to S&D, the key outcomes of the GATT Review were (a) the acceptance of S&D for 
developing countries as a legal principle within the GATT,4 and (b) the “fuller and now almost 
enthusiastic endorsement of the idea”5 that the provision of legal freedoms within GATT was 
beneficial to developing countries.6 By virtue of these developments, LDCs had acquired the legal 
freedom to effectively deviate from or opt out of the mainstream GATT rules relating to sectorial 
state assistance.7 
As part of the GATT Review, the principle of there being full reciprocity between parties negotiating 
tariffs was relaxed.8 Clause 3 of the newly inserted Article XXIX (“Tariff Negotiations”) states that 
tariff negotiations involving LDCs should be carried out in a flexible manner reflective of (a) tariff 
usage to assist economic development,9 and (b) tariff usage as a revenue source.10  From these 
aspects, it can be inferred that during trade negotiations, developed countries are not to press 
for full reciprocity from LDCs;11 thus, the principle of reciprocity need not necessarily be applied.12 
By allowing LDCs to opt out of reciprocity, the contracting parties had thus extended the scope of 
1- Id.
2- Delegation Release, Speech by U Aung Soe (Burma) Delivered in Plenary Session on 10 November 1954, GATT Doc. MGT/54/54 
(10 Nov. 1954), at 1, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/MGT/54-54.PDF.
3- Press Release, Speech by Mr. A Dominique, (Haiti) Delivered in Plenary Session on 10 November 1954, GATT Doc. GATT/199 
(10 Nov. 1954), at 2. 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/GATT/199.PDF
4- Ansong, supra note 21, at 25.
5- Hudec, supra note 18, at 42-43.
6- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 41; Hudec, supra note 18, at 43.
7- GATT 1994, supra note 9, art. XVIII(4)(a) (Governmental Assistance to Economic Development), https://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art18_e.pdf.
8- Hudec, supra note 18, at 42.
9- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Review Working Party II on Tariffs, Schedules and Customs Administration, Report 
to the Contracting Parties, GATT Doc. L/329 (24 Feb. 1955), art. XXIX, ¶¶ 3 & 3(ii), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/
English/SULPDF/90680411.pdf [hereinafter Working Party Review]; Nottage, Trade and Competition, supra note 28, at 25.
10- Id. ¶ 3(ii). 
11- Hudec, supra note 18, at 42; Batista, supra note 28, at 169; Edwini Kessie, The Legal status of Special and Differential 
Treatment Provisions under the WTO Agreements, in WTO Law, supra note 28, at 17.
12- Heron, supra note 17, at 16.
8S&D provisions.1 Furthermore, as Heron notes, while the GATT Review per se was not noteworthy 
in terms of substantive reforms, it appeared to create an environment and understanding that 
the development of S&D was to be mirrored by a decline in the legal enforcement of GATT 
principles as applied to developing countries.2 
It is clear that the principle that developing countries should benefit from S&D, referenced at the 
inception of the GATT, was enshrined in the GATT body of law during the mid-1950s GATT review. 
Additionally, the GATT review widened not only the scope of S&D but also and for the first time, 
proffered opt-outs to developing countries and began the process of differentiating the S&D 
treatment that should be offered to the LDCs.
. 1.3 Grounding S&D - the Haberler Report & the GATT, Part IV
Citing Tussie3 and Evans,4 Hawthorne describes the 1958 Haberler report (Trends in International 
Trade)5 as a pivotal point in the relations between developed and developing countries.6 Analysts 
agree that there was virtually no implementation of the primary recommendations of the report7 
and that it did not lead to significant changes in GATT policies.8 Nevertheless, Heron hails it as a 
“milestone” that marked a change in the orientation of developing country concerns.9 Lanoszka10 
argues specifically that the emphasis placed by the Haberler report on the special considerations 
required for developing countries11 formed the basis upon which S&D for LDCs was developed.12
A further shift came in 1965, a protocol amended the GATT and introduced a new Part IV.13 The 
protocol, while recognising that positive efforts were needed to ensure that LDCs achieved growth 
in trade, contained no legally definable obligations regarding that concern.14 But Article XXVII, at 
paragraph 8, does state that developed countries, “do not expect reciprocity for commitments 
made in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-
developed contracting parties.”15 This, Hawthorne argues, is evidence that the contracting parties 
had agreed to override the norm of reciprocity for the first time in an official GATT document.16 
1- Working Party Review, supra note 39.
2- Heron, supra note 17, at 16.
3- Diana Tussie, The Less Developed Countries and the World Trading System: A Challenge to the Gatt 4 (Studies in Int’l 
Political Econ. No. 1 1987).
4- John W. Evans, The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of the G.A.T.T.? 120 (1971).
5- Note, Executive Secretary, Trends in International Trade (Preliminary Version), GATT Doc. MGT/80/58 (Aug. 1958) 
[hereinafter Trends], https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/MGT/58-80.PDF. 
6- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 41.
7- Michael Hart & Bill Dymond, Special and Differential Treatment and the Doha “Development” Round, 37 J. World Trade 
395, 400 (2003); Rorden Wilkinson & James Scott, Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A Reassessment, 7 World 
Trade Rev. 473, 490 (2008), file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/wilkinsonandscottworldtradereview.pdf.
8- Heron, supra note 17, at 17.
9- Id.
10- Anna Lanoszka, The World Trade Organization: Changing Dynamics in the Global Political Economy (2009).
11- Trends, supra note 47.
12- Lanoszka, supra note 52, at 201; Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 42.
13- Protocol Amending the GATT to introduce Part IV on Trade and Development (12 Feb. 1965), GATT Doc. L/2355 [hereinafter 
Protocol]. https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/L2799/2355.PDF.
14- Hudec, supra note 18, at 64.
15- Protocol, supra note 55.
16- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 43.
9. 1.4 The Tokyo Declaration 1973
As noted above, until the 1970s the GATT only recognised developed countries and less-developed 
countries. There was no stratification or differentiation between the least developed and 
developing countries. 
While, as noted above, Hawthorne has offered evidence of LDC recognition within the GATT 
council minutes of 1971,1 LDCs were not formally recognised2 as a defined group3 within the GATT 
trade arena until the Tokyo Round of 1973 and its Enabling Clause.4 The declaration followed a 
Ministerial meeting in that city5 where the Ministers stated that special attention and special 
treatment should be paid to “the least developed among the developing countries.”6 Not only 
were LDCs recognised as a special group, the Enabling Clause also conceptually grounded S&D for 
LDCs at the centre of the GATT legal system.7 This grounding is clearly illustrated in Paragraph 
6 of the Enabling Clause, which, inter alia, stated that during trade negotiations with LDCs, 
“developed countries shall exercise the utmost restraint in seeking . . . and the least-developed 
countries shall not be expected to make concessions or contributions that are inconsistent with 
the recognition of their particular situation and problems.”8
The Enabling Clause also provided that LDCs were to be afforded “special treatment…in the 
context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries.”9 The provisions 
of the Enabling Clause allowed LDCs to seek the application of S&D to all concessions made by 
developed countries to developing countries and this became one of the core elements of a work 
programme of a separate LDC sub-committee10 (which will be discussed in section 2). 
. 2 The expansion and development of S&D
Following the conclusion of the Tokyo Round in 1979 and the negotiations that accompanied it, a work 
programme was initiated to “ensure that the results of the negotiations are effectively implemented.”11 
To this end, a Committee on Trade and Development was created,12 part of whose role was defined as 
providing “special attention to the special problems of least developed countries.”13 
Concerning this role, the committee opined that its primary responsibility was to oversee and supervise 
1- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 45; GATT Council Minutes, supra note 6. 
2- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 45; GATT Council Minutes, supra note 6. 
3- Note: the possibility of defining LDCs was considered in 1964, but the idea was deferred. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Committee on the Legal and Institutional Framework of GATT in relation to Less-Developed Countries, Report of Committee (Revision), 
GATT Doc. L/2195/Rev.1 (13 Apr. 1964), at 3, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/L2799/2195R1.PDF.
4- 1973 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5, at 5.
5- 1973 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5.
6- Id. at 4.
7- See Kessie, supra note 41, at 18; Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 45; Nottage, Trade and Competition, supra note 28, at 27; 
Pangestu, supra note 17, at 1288; John Whalley, Non-Discriminatory Discrimination: Special and Differential Treatment 
Under the GATT for Developing Countries, 100 The Econ. J. 1318, 1321 (1990).
8- GATT, supra note 4, at 3.
9- Id. at 2.
10- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sub-Committee on Trade of Least-Developed Countries, Proceedings of First 
Meeting, GATT Doc. COM.TD/LLDC/1 (12 Jan. 1981), at 6, https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90560165.
pdf [hereinafter, Sub-Committee, Proceedings].
11- Proposal by the Director-General, GATT Work Programme, GATT Doc. C/W/334(22 Nov. 1979).
12- Id. at 3.
13- Id.
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the implementation of the Enabling Clause, particularly in relations to LDCs;1 it also pondered the 
creation of a separate body for LDCs.2
In March 1980 the Committee on Trade and Development again discussed the creation of a separate 
body specifically for LDCs. The proposal met with fierce opposition from some developed countries 
and this opposition in turn evoked an angry response from some of the eleven LDC members of the 
committee.3 The LDC members stated that very little had been achieved in terms of ameliorating 
their trade problems and they feared that “in the absence of specific machinery to focus on their 
problems, their interests once more might not get the attention required.”4 
Despite the objections, in July 1980, following discussions held by the Director General,5 a Sub-
Committee on Trade of Least Developed Countries was created.6 Thus, at last, LDCs now not only had 
a means to articulate their views but also the ability to focus on specific LDC problems within the 
GATT.7 Further, as will be shown, they now had a way to broaden the scope and nature of S&D.
. 2.1 The progressive development of S&D
At the inaugural meeting of the new sub-committee in 1981, LDCs began to flesh out their ideas 
and policy stances: they called for (a) special measures including duty-free access for all LDC 
exports to developed countries,8 (b) the review of developments in world trade9 to be extended to 
include payments and finance,10 (c) the extension of S&D to the provision of technical assistance 
and training by the secretariat11 and (d) the provision of special financial assistance to assist 
LDCs in maximising the effectiveness of the S&D provisions provided for under the Tokyo Round 
Agreements.12 
The first meeting also proposed extending the remit of the review of developments in international 
trade to include such matters as commercial policy13 as well as the activities of other GATT 
bodies14 and other international bodies.15 In other words, the range and scope of S&D were being 
extended. 
1- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Committee on Trade & Development, Work Programme of the Committee on 
Trade and Development, GATT Doc. COM.TD/W/305 (19 Feb. 1980), at 6, https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/
SULPDF/90540100.pdf.
2- Id.
3- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Committee on Trade and Development, Membership of the Committee on Trade 
and Development, GATT Doc. COM.TD/75/Rev.ll (12 June 1980), 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/COMTD/75R11.PDF.
4- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Committee on Trade and Development, Proceedings of the Fortieth Session, GATT 
Doc. COM.TD/104 (14 Apr. 1980), at 20, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/COMTD/104.PDF.
5- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Committee on Trade and Development, Proceedings of the Forty-First Session, 
GATT Doc. COM.TD/105 (7 Aug. 1980), at 15, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/COMTD/105.PDF.
6- Id.
7- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 47.
8- Sub-Committee, Proceedings, supra note 68.
9- Id. at 1.
10- Id. at 3.
11- Id. at 4.
12- Id.
13- Id. at 6.
14- Id.
15- Id.
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For the 1982 Ministerial meeting,1 the sub-committee submitted six proposals.2 Three of these 
proposals were (i) the provision of more flexible rules of origin for LDC products,3 (ii) a call 
for greater flexibility for the participation of LDCs in MTN (Multilateral Trade Negotiation) 
agreements4 and (iii) the strengthening of technical assistance for LDCs.5 Once again, proposals 
sought to broaden and extend the scope of S&D beyond simply that of asymmetrical reciprocity 
and unilateral preferences in trade negotiations. All the proposals were approved at the Ministerial 
Meeting.6
. 2.2 The evolution of S&D as a driver for LDC trade policy
The combination of the Enabling Clause and the subsequent creation of the sub-committee not 
only gave the LDCs a platform from which they could articulate their views and focus on specific 
LDC problems within the GATT, it also heralded a sea change in the policy stances of many LDCs. 
By the early 1960s there were signs that LDCs were beginning both to embrace the concept 
of S&D and to incorporate it into their trade policies. By that decade, too, some countries 
were already proposing both “traditional” S&D measures7 and S&D measures designed to provide 
access to industrialised markets for exports deemed to be “of vital interest to the less-developed 
countries.”8
Further evidence of this palpable LDC policy shift in favour of the pursuit of S&D and moreover, 
the aggressiveness with which the policy was pursued can be found in the statements made by 
LDCs at the 1982 ministerial meeting. The permanent representative of Madagascar was perhaps 
the most blunt and outspoken of the LDCs. In a scathing rebuke to the GATT contracting parties, 
he stated:
With great condescension, the rich accepted the idea that the poor must be given differential 
and preferential treatment on the world market, but Part IV, which they kindly agreed to include 
in the General Agreement for that purpose, has still not been put into effect after fifteen years.9
Madagascar plainly viewed S&D and its implementation to be a central part of its overall GATT 
policy.
Demonstrating that S&D also represented a significant policy driver for Uganda within the 
multilateral trade arena, Uganda’s Minister of Commerce spoke similarly about the lack of 
1- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Ministerial Declaration, GATT Contracting Parties, Thirty-Eighth Session, W.38/4 
(29 Nov. 1982), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/W/38-4.PDF [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration, 38th Sess.].
2- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sub-Committee on Trade of Least-Developed Countries, Note on Proceedings of 
Third Meeting, GATT Doc. COM.TD/LLDC/3 (30 June 1982), at 7-8, 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/COMTD/LLDC3.PDF.
3- Id. at 7.
4- Id.
5- Id.
6- Ministerial Declaration, 38th Sess., supra note 87.
7- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Press Release, Meeting of Ministers 1621- May 1963: Statement made by Mr 
Suminwa, Counsellor of Embassy at Brussels, Congo (Leopoldville), GATT Doc. GATT/784 (16 May 1963), at 2, https://docs.
wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/GATT/784.PDF.
8- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Committee on the Legal and Institutional Framework of the GATT in Relation to 
the Less-Developed Countries, Statement by the Representative of the Central African Republic, GATT Doc. Spec(63)282 
(24 Oct. 1963), at 3, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/SPEC/63-282.pdf.
9- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Ministerial Meeting (24-27 Nov. 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Ministerial Meeting], 
Statement by Mr. Maurice Ramarozka, Minister Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative AI of Madagascar, GATT Doc. 
Spec (82) 142 (24-27 Nov. 1982), at 3 (emphasis added), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/SPEC/82-142.pdf.
12
commitment evinced by developed countries.1 He threatened to block proposals that Trade in 
Services be incorporated into the GATT. 
Bangladesh, another of the LDCs, formulated a set of proposals, predicated upon the S&D 
principle, that was presented at the meeting by its Minister for Industries and Commerce. The 
proposals called for a number of non-reciprocal special measures to permit (i) duty-free access 
to the exports of LDCs,2 (ii) the introduction of flexible rules of origin for LDC exports,3 and (iii) 
the elimination of non-tariff export barriers in respect of LDCs.4
The LDC activities at the 1982 ministerial meeting demonstrate the degree to which S&D had 
permeated their trade policies. Moreover, the threats to block the proposal to incorporate Trade 
in Services into the GATT regime5 highlight both the importance of S&D within the trade policies 
of the LDCs and the aggressiveness with which they were prepared to pursue their S&D policies. 
As far as the author can determine, academic writers, including Hawthorne6 in her seminal work 
on LDCs and Special Treatment in Trade, have all failed to explore the linkage of S&D to the trade 
policies pursued by the LDCs. Most writers take an “applied” approach to S&D in terms of its use 
in gaining leverage in negotiations,7 or as a negotiated concession,8 or as a series of exemptions,9 
but not as a particular policy or programme.10 Gibbs refers to S&D as being” the product of the 
coordinated political efforts of developing countries.”11 However, this statement falls some way 
short of describing S&D as a policy driver for LDCs. In contrast, the author’s research establishes 
a link between S&D and the trade policies of LDCs; it thus represents an addition to the extant 
body of academic knowledge. Viewing LDC actions through the prism of S&D as the core policy 
driver forces a complete reappraisal and reassessment of S&D and its application by LDCs.
. 3 S&D as a key policy driver in the Uruguay Round
During the Uruguay Round of 19861994-, S&D continued to drive LDC policy in terms of negotiation 
objectives and strategies. More specifically, their S&D-driven objectives and strategies manifested 
themselves in the proposals made by LDCs during the negotiations that resulted in the formulation and 
drafting of the terms of the DSU. Furthermore, when faced with the final draft of the DSU, which had 
the overwhelming support of WTO members (both developed and developing), LDCs instead proposed 
an “opt out,” using S&D.
1- 1982 Ministerial Meeting, supra note 95, Statement by the Hon. Joel M Aliro-Omara, MP, Minister of Commerce of Uganda, 
GATT Doc. Spec (82) 143, at 1, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/SPEC/82-143.pdf.
2- 1982 Ministerial Meeting, supra note 95, Statement by the Minister for Industries and Commerce, Government of the 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh, GATT Doc. Spec (82) 99, at 2. https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/SPEC/82-99.pdf.
3- Id.
4- Id.
5- Id.; 1982 Ministerial Meeting, supra note 95, Statement by the Minister for Trade of the United Republic of Tanzania, GATT 
Doc. Spec (82) 131, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/SPEC/82-142.pdf
6- Hawthorne, supra note 2.
7- Kessie, supra note 41, at 17-18.
8- Stefan De Vylder, The Least Developed Countries and World Trade 97 (2d ed., Sida Studies, 2007).
9- Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the WTO, 14 World Trade Rev. 
67, 68 (2015).
10- De Vylder, supra note 103, at 95.
11- Murray Gibbs, UNCTAD, Note presented to the G15 Symposium on Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO 
Agreements: Special and Differential Treatment in the Context of Globalization (New Delhi, 10 Dec. 1998), https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/sem01_e/gibbs_e.doc.
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The GATT contracting parties initiated the Uruguay Round at a Ministerial Meeting in September 1986 
in Punta Del Este, Uruguay. The Round’s trade negotiations, not concluded until 1994, are regarded as 
the largest, most comprehensive set of trade negotiations ever undertaken.1 Among its key outcomes 
were the creation of the WTO and the adoption of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (known as the DSU),2 which was enshrined into trade law. Key 
indicators that S&D represented a core policy objective of the LDCs in the Uruguay Round are to be 
found in the addresses of the LDC representatives at Punta Del Este, where they clearly outlined their 
countries’ policy aims vis-a-vis the negotiations. 
The representative for Bangladesh set out a list of key S&D areas that his delegation “consider[ed] 
vitally important”3 for the negotiations. The broad ranging coverage of the list included (i) strict 
adherence to, and the expansion of, S&D in all areas;4 (ii) complete duty-free access to all LDC 
exports;5 (iii) the elimination of all types of non-tariff measures, restrictions, and measures affecting 
LDC producers;6 (iv) flexible rules of origin for LDC exports;7 (v) preferential treatment for the LDCs in 
the application of safeguards, dispute settlement, MTN agreements, and all other relevant matters;8 
and (vi) the expansion of technical assistance.9 
The expansive nature of the foregoing “vitally important” list reveals S&D as a pivotal part of the 
Bangladesh policy. Further, throughout the representative’s text, there were clear calls for the 
expansion of S&D. For example, the representative called for the elimination of all types of non-tariff 
measures. Similarly, Bangladesh sought preferential treatment in the areas of safeguards, dispute 
settlement and all “other relevant matters in which . . . [LDCs] . . . are at a disadvantage.”10 
Intuitively, given that LDCs are, by their very nature, always at a disadvantage, the term “other 
relevant matters” signalled the intention of Bangladesh to broaden the application of S&D beyond 
that of asymmetrical reciprocity and unilateral preferences into all facets of the Uruguay Round. It 
is also of note that Bangladesh explicitly singled out dispute settlement as an area where it intended 
to seek “preferential treatment.” The ramifications of that strategy are discussed in detail below. 
Other LDCs made proposals along similar lines. Tanzania’s Minister for Industries and Trade11 set out 
the Tanzanian policy objectives. Strikingly, the first objective—a clear indication of its importance and 
fundamental role—was that priority must be given to the “effective and meaningful implementation of 
. . . provisions on differential and more favourable treatment . . . paying special attention to the least 
1- Note: The negotiations involved 123 countries and spanned virtually every aspect of trade. See Understanding the WTO, 
supra note 4.
2- DSU, supra note 9.
3- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Bangladesh: Statement at the Meeting of the GATT Contracting Parties at 
Ministerial Level, 1519- September, Punta Del Este, Uruguay, GATT Doc. MIN(86)/ST/9 (16 Sept. 1986), at 3, https://www.
wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240021.pdf.
4- Id. at 4.
5- Id.
6- Id.
7- Id.
8- Id.
9- Id.
10- Id.
11- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Tanzania: Statement by Hon BP Mramba, Minister for Industries and Trade, at 
the meeting of the GATT Contracting Parties at Ministerial Level, 1519- September, Punta Del Este, Uruguay, GATT Doc. 
MIN(86)/ST/50 (18 Sept. 1986) at 1, https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240063.pdf.
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developed.” 1 Indicating similar embedding and significance of S&D in his country’s strategies, the 
Burmese representative2 stated, inter alia, that Burma attached “great importance to a substantial 
improvement”3 in the treatment of developing countries. Finally, the Congo submitted a proposal on 
behalf, inter alia, of itself, the LDC Senegal, and Tanzania,4 to strengthen the S&D provisions.5 Thus, 
at the Uruguay Round, LDC policy in general was to a greater or lesser degree predicated upon, or 
driven by, S&D.
. 3.1 S&D and the DSU negotiations
Having discussed the broad LDC policy objectives and strategies, this paper will now consider the 
way in which these objectives manifested themselves within the LDC proposals made during the 
Uruguay Round.
The Punta del Este ministerial declaration6 provided, inter alia, that the overall programme 
of negotiations was to be facilitated through the creation of a Trade Negotiations Committee.7 
Separate negotiation groups, which would report to the Trade Negotiations Committee,8 were to 
be created for the negotiations on Goods9 and on Services.10 Four LDCs11 became members of the 
Trade Negotiations Committee12 and each of the two negotiation groups.13 
As mentioned above, LDCs had been active participants in a sub-committee of the Committee 
on Trade and Development. While this committee did not directly participate in the Uruguay 
negotiations per se, it did have an “important role in keeping under review the progress of 
negotiations from the point of view of developing countries.”14 In the early part of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations, there had been no meetings of the sub-committee.15 But at the sixty-first 
1- Id. at 2.
2- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Burma: Statement by H.E. U Tin Tun, Permanent Representative, at the meeting 
of the GATT Contracting Parties at Ministerial Level, 1519- September, Punta Del Este, Uruguay, GATT Doc. MIN (86)/ST/69 
(19 Sept. 1986), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240086.pdf.
3- Id. at 2.
4- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Contracting Parties, Session at Ministerial Level, September 1986, Communication 
from the Congo GATT Doc. MIN(86)/W/18 (19 Sept. 1986), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/TNCMIN86/ST19.PDF. 
5- Id. ¶ 2.
6- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Ministerial Declaration on 
the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. MIN.DEC (20 Sept. 1986),  https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240152.pdf 
[hereinafter Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round].
7- Id. at 1.
8- Id. at 9, 10.
9- Id. at 9.
10- Id. at 10.
11- The four LDCs were Bangladesh, Burma, Senegal, and Tanzania. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Multilateral 
Trade Negotiation, The Uruguay Round, List of Representatives, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/INF/1-MTN.GNG/INF/1-MTN.GNS/
INF/1 (27 Oct. 1986), at 2-3, 21, & 23, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNG/INF1.PDF (listing representatives on 
the Trade Negotiations Committee, the Group of Negotiations of Goods, and the Group of Negotiation on Services) 
[hereinafter 1986 List of Representatives].
12- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trade Negotiations Committee, Meeting of 27 October 1986, GATT Doc. MTN.
TNC/1 (17 Nov. 1986), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/TNC/1.PDF.
13- See List of Representatives, supra note 128, at 2-3, 21, & 23.
14- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Committee on Trade and Development, Sixty-First Session, 11-12 June 1987, 
Annotated Provisional Agenda, GATT Doc. COM.TD/W/448 (12 May 1987), at 1, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/
COMTD/W448.PDF.
15- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 50.
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meeting of the Committee on Trade and Development in 1987, LDCs successfully proposed that 
the sub-committee be re-activated.1 
The restoration of the sub-committee2 gave LDCs a forum where they could review the Uruguay 
negotiations from an LDC perspective,3 discuss proposals that had been submitted by LDCs to 
the negotiation groups4 and formulate and discuss the submission of future proposals.5 This sub-
committee became, in effect, both a clearing-house for S&D-driven proposals and a pressure 
group to highlight LDC interests in the wider Uruguay Round negotiations.6 The significance of the 
influence of this sub-committee on the negotiations surrounding the DSU will be discussed below.
Returning to the Trade Negotiations Committee tasks, part I of The Ministerial Declaration on 
the Uruguay Round provided, inter alia, that Dispute Settlement was one of the subjects for 
negotiation.7 These negotiations would form part of the workload of the Group of Negotiations 
on Goods,8 whose members, as noted above, included LDC representatives.9 The Group of 
Negotiations on Goods decided, in turn, that further sub-negotiation groups be established, 
spanning either one area or multiple areas of the negotiations.10 One of them, the Negotiating 
Group on Dispute Settlement was established in February 198711 and held its inaugural meeting 
on the 10th of April 1987.12 This sub-committee included three LDC representatives: Bangladesh,13 
Madagascar,14 and Tanzania.15
By November 1987 in the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, there had been some twelve 
1- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Committee on Trade and Development, Sixty-First Session, 22 June 1987, 
Proceedings of the Sixty-First Session, GATT Doc. COM.TD/126 (18 Aug. 1987), at 6, https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/
English/SULPDF/91290169.pdf [hereinafter Sixty-First Proceedings]; Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 50. 
2- Sixty-First Proceedings, supra note 133, at 7.
3- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 50.
4- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sub-Committee on Trade of Least-Developed Countries, Ninth Meeting, 11 February 
1988, Review of Developments in the Uruguay Round of Interest to the Least-Developed Countries, GATT Doc. COM.TD/
LLDC/W/32, (21 Jan.1988), at 4, 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/COMTD/LLDCW32.PDF.
5- See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sub-Committee on Trade of Least-Developed Countries, 28 September 1989, 
Note of Proceedings of the Eleventh Meeting, Revision, GATT Doc. COM.TD/LLDC/12/Rev. 1 (27 Nov. 1989), https://docs.
wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/COMTD/LLDC12R1.PDF [hereinafter Note of LDC Sub-Comm. Proceedings].
6- Hawthorne, supra note 2, at 50.
7-  Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 123.
8- Id. at 9.
9- See 1986 List of Representatives, supra note 128.
10- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Group of Negotiations on Goods, Second meeting: 7 and 12 November 1986, GATT 
Doc. MTN.GNG/2 (26 Nov. 1986), at 1, https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92020013.pdf.  
11- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Group of Negotiations on Goods, Fifth Meeting of the Group of Negotiations on 
Goods: Record of Decisions Taken, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/5 (9 Feb. 1987), at 3, https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/
SULPDF/92020026.pdf.
12- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 6th April 1987, GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NG13/1 (10 Apr. 1987), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/document.php?id=history/urdsu/1.pdf.
13- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, List of Representatives, GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NG13/INF/1 (21 Sept. 1987), at 2, https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92030003.pdf.
14- Id. at 7.
15- Id. at 11.
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substantive proposals1 submitted by some sixteen different countries, as well as contributions 
from the Nordic states2 and the European Community.3 Two background papers had been provided 
by the GATT secretariat.4 Significantly, there appear to have been no proposals from any of the 
LDCs to this date. 
Given the absence of specific proposals it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the degree 
of participation and activism of LDCs within the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement. 
The minutes of the meetings were formally written and typically did not identify the member 
or delegation concerned in a given matter. For example, on the 11th of July 1988, the sub-
committee members were debating the note prepared by the Secretariat dealing with S&D 
in the GATT Dispute Settlement System.5 Representative minute entries include the phrases 
“Many delegations,” “representatives of a number of countries,” “other delegations” and “one 
delegation.”6 From such entries, it is impossible to determine the nationality of any particular 
delegation or representative.
Evidence supporting the participation of LDCs in the negotiations can be found further along, 
however, in the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement minutes of 4 October 1988.7 Concerning 
the Secretarial note referenced above, the minutes state “a number of less-developed contracting 
parties...called on developed contracting parties to offer their views on the specific proposals 
for differential and more favourable treatment.”8 This intervention not only indicates activism 
of the LDCs within the negotiating group but also reinforces the earlier points about LDC policy 
being driven by S&D. 
By mid-October 1988, in the apparent absence of substantive proposals from the LDCs, the 
Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement began to finalise its proposals for the DSU.9 The Group 
Chairman was tasked with formulating a comprehensive proposal, which was to be accompanied 
by recommendations that the resolution be approved at the Mid-Term Ministerial Review and that 
a trial implementation commence on 1 January 1989.10
1- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 9th November 1987, 
Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/4 (18 Nov. 1987), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNGNG13/4.
PDF. The substantive proposals were from Mexico (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/1), New Zealand (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/2), the United 
States (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/3 and 6), Jamaica (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/5), Japan (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/7 and 9), Switzerland 
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/8), Australia (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/11), Canada (MTN.GNC/NG13/W/13) and Nicaragua (MTN.GNG/
NG13/W(15); Argentina, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico and Uruguay (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/16); and Argentina (MTN.
GNG/NG13/W/17) and Hungary (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/18). 
2- Id. (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/10).    
3- Id. (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/12).
4- Id. (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/4 and 14).
5- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment of Developing Countries in the GATT Dispute Settlement System, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.
GNG/NGI3/W/27 (30 June 1988), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92050090.pdf; Revision, MTN.GNG/
NG13/W/27/Rev.1 (22 Aug. 1988), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92050172.pdf). 
6- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting on 11 July 1988, GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NG13/9 (21 July 1988), at 2, https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92050144.pdf.
7- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting on 6 and 7 September 1988, 
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/10 (4 Oct. 1988), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92060017.pdf.
8- Id. at 2.
9- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 1012- October 1988, GATT 
Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/11 (24 Oct. 1988), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92060062.pdf.
10- Id. at 1.
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The reference to the chairman’s task was subsequently removed from the official minutes of the 
October meeting. 1 Nevertheless, by the 15 November 1988 meeting,2 the Negotiating Group on 
Dispute Settlement discussed drafts of (i) the Chairman’s report to the Group of Negotiations on 
Goods 3 and (ii) a Chairman’s Paper containing a proposal for “improvements to existing GATT 
dispute settlement rules and procedures, for adoption by Ministers at the Mid-Term Review and 
for trial application as of January 1989.”4 The group further agreed to continue with informal 
talks to seek final agreement on the Chairman’s report, due to be submitted to the Group of 
Negotiations on Goods, whose mid-term review was to begin on 16 November.5
The Chairman’s report to the Group of Negotiations on Goods, the tenor of the minutes, and the 
lack of any substantive complaints suggests broad agreement within the Negotiating Group on 
Dispute Settlement as to the revisions that were to be made to dispute settlement. It appears 
that by the middle of November 1988 the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, having 
discussed all the proposals previously submitted to them, gave no indication of feeling a need for 
further discussion. Indeed, the negotiating group did not meet again until 12 May 1989,6 nearly 
six months later.
What the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement appears to have been unaware of, however, 
is that Bangladesh was preparing to submit some radical proposals on behalf of the LDCs. At a 
meeting of the Sub-Committee on Trade of Least-Developed Countries (LDC Trade sub-committee) 
on 28 September 1989,7 Bangladesh noted that the Uruguay Round negotiations had reached a 
“crucial phase”8 where the positions of all parties in relation to various issues and proposals in 
each of the negotiating groups had to be finalized.9 To this end, Bangladesh, inter alia, outlined 
specific proposals respecting Dispute Settlement that were to be submitted to the Negotiating 
Group on Dispute Settlement “in the coming weeks.”10 
These proposals satisfied what one representative of the LDC Trade sub-committee described 
as “the need for more simplified procedures in dispute settlement involving least-developed 
countries.”11 Of the four substantive proposals,12 some were subsequently “taken on board, 
though not to the full extent desired.”13 But the same could not be said for what was the most 
radical of these proposals, which sought:
1- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 1012- October 1988, 
Corrigendum GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGl3/ll/Corr.l. (15 Nov. 1988), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNGNG13/11C1.PDF.
2- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 15 November 1988, GATT 
Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/13 (24 Nov. 1988), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92060140.pdf.
3- Id. at 1.
4- Id.
5- Id.
6- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 12 May 
1989, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/14 (2 June 1989), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/
SULPDF/92070056.pdf [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Group May 1989 Mtg.] 
7- Note of LDC Sub-Comm. Proceedings, supra note 137. 
8- Id. at 2.
9- Id.
10- Id.
11- Id. at 3.
12- Id. at 14.
13- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sub-Committee on Trade of Least-Developed Countries, Draft Note of Proceedings 
of the of the Twelfth Meeting, GATT Doc. Spec (90) 43 (26 Nov. 1990), at 3, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/
SPEC/90-43.pdf [hereinafter Draft Note of Proceedings].
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Establishment of a separate body (e.g. Group of Five) comprising of the Chairmen of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, Council, Committee on Trade and Development, Sub-Committee on the 
Trade of the Least-Developed Countries and the Director-General of GATT, should be explored 
with the objective of settling disputes involving the least-developed countries.1
This proposal, which received the “wholehearted support” of all the other LDC Trade sub-
committee representatives,2 specifically called for LDCs to be given S&D in dispute settlement 
through the creation of a specific body outside of the existing GATT dispute structure to deal 
specifically with disputes involving LDCs. 
In other words, the LDCs wholeheartedly wanted to opt out of both the existing GATT dispute 
settlement regimen and its successor, the DSU. 
The proposals were communicated by Bangladesh, on behalf of the LDCs, to the Group of 
Negotiations on Goods,3 of which the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement was a sub-
committee, on the 14th of November 1989. As there was no mention of this development in the 
minutes of the Negotiating Group Dispute Settlement on the 15th of November 1989,4 it can be 
surmised that the contents of the Bangladesh proposal were not conveyed to that group (though 
given the incomplete nature of the minutes of these meetings, this cannot be absolutely verified). 
Indeed, in the November 1989 Ministerial Level Report provided by the Group of Negotiations 
on Goods for the December meeting of the Trades Negotiations Committee5 (which had overall 
responsibility for the conduct of the Uruguay negotiations) there is no mention of the Bangladesh 
proposal. In relation to Dispute Settlement, the report opined that while there were certain 
issues that required consideration, nevertheless the group conducting the negotiations on dispute 
settlement felt that they were “in a position to make a comprehensive proposal for consideration 
and approval...and for trial application as of January 1989 until the close of the Uruguay Round.”6 
Moreover, the report laid out at length in a two-column format those areas where consensus had 
been reached and those where consideration by Ministers were required.7 Once again, there is no 
reference throughout to the proposals by Bangladesh.
The only reference to further proposals is contained in a letter from the Chairman of the Sub-
committee on the Trade of LDCs to the Chairman of the Group of Negotiations on Goods intimating, 
inter alia, that further proposals from the LDCs would be forthcoming and requesting that this be 
brought to the attention of the Montreal review meeting.8
The mid-term review was conducted in two parts, the first being in Montreal from the fifth 
1- Note of LDC Sub-Comm. Proceedings, supra note 137, at 14.
2- Id. at 3.
3- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Negotiating Group on Dispute 
Settlement, Proposals on Behalf of the Least-developed Countries, Communication from Bangladesh, MTN.GNG/NGI3/W34 
(14 Nov. 1989), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNGNG13/W34.PDF [hereinafter Communication from Bangladesh].
4- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 15 November 
1988, MTN.GNG/NG13/13 (24 Nov. 1988), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNGNG13/13.PDF.
5- Group of Negotiation on Goods, Report to the Trade Negotiations Committee meeting at Ministerial level, Montreal, 
December 1988, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/13 (22 Nov. 1988), 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNG/13.PDF [hereinafter Report to the Trade Negotiations Comm.].
6- Id. at 31.
7- Id. at 54-67.
8- See Multilateral Trade negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Communication from the 
Chairman of the Sub-Committee of Trade of Least-Developed Countries, GATT Doc. MTNGNG/W/15 (7 Nov. 1988), at 1-2, 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNG/W15.PDF; Report to the Trade Negotiations Comm., supra note 175.
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through the ninth of December 1988 and the second part being held in Geneva from the fifth 
through the eighth of April 1989.1 From the consolidated Ministerial Decisions at these meetings, 
the proposals contained in the report to the Trade Negotiations Committee, together with the 
proposal for a trial period, were approved at the mid-term Ministerial review.2 Moreover the 
Ministers provided an agreed text in relation to those areas where Ministerial guidance was 
requested.3 Nowhere in the combined text is there any reference to the LDC proposals, which 
again highlights the degree to which consensus had been largely reached on the framework of the 
DSU. That said, there was still work to be done.
The next meeting of the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement was convened on the 12th 
of May 1989.4 Bangladesh agreed to present the LDC proposals in detail at  the July meeting.5 
At the July meeting the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement postponed the discussion of 
the proposal due to the absence of a Bangladeshi representative.6 At the next meeting of the 
Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement in September 1989, the Chairman agreed to a request 
from Bangladesh to postpone its presentation of its detailed proposals to a future meeting.7 It 
should be noted that during this period, the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement was making 
significant strides toward the finalization of agreed text, as discussed below. 
On 7 December 1989 the proposals submitted by Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs were 
discussed.8 Explaining the proposals, Bangladesh emphasised that the LDCs were “less equal 
among contracting parties.”9 Moreover, Bangladesh stressed that the proposals were not merely 
seeking ad hoc S&D measures “but . . . the permanent institutionalization”10 of S&D measures in 
favour of LDCs.
As previously noted, the Bangladesh proposals included a call for the creation of a separate 
and distinct dispute resolution system, which would operate outside the normal GATT dispute 
framework. This proposal was both premised upon and justified by S&D,11 which clearly indicates 
the degree to which S&D systemically framed and permeated LDC policy.
Some delegations supported the proposals on the basis that S&D should be applied to LDCs. 
Others voiced various concerns and one developing member stated that it would be “neither 
feasible nor appropriate to set up special procedures” for LDCs.12 The Chairman at this point 
intervened, suggesting the matter be deferred to a future meeting.13 
1- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Trade Negotiations Committee, Mid-Term Meeting, GATT Doc. MTN.
TNC/11 (21 Apr. 1989), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/TNC/11.PDF.
2- Id. at 24.
3- Id. at 24-31.
4- See Dispute Settlement Group May 1989 Mtg., supra note 163.
5-  Id. at 2.
6- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 20 July 1989, 
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/15 (26 July 1989), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNGNG13/15.PDF.
7- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 28 September 
1989, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/16 (13 Nov. 1989), at 7, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNGNG13/16.PDF.
8- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 7 December 
1989, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/17 (15 Dec. 1989), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNGNG13/17.PDF.
9- Id. at 1.
10- Id.
11- Id.
12- Id.
13- Id.
20
A further meeting was held in February 1990 where, the minutes record, “No comments were 
made”1 concerning the LDC proposals. Later, the Chairman cautioned that “time was running 
out,” reminding the group members that proposals should be circulated prior to the next meeting 
so that substantive negotiations could begin.2 It is unclear from this missive whether this caution 
was intended as a spur to the LDC representatives. However, in light of the fact that the phrase 
“no comments were made” was recorded concerning the first item on the agenda—the proposals 
by the LDCs—this would not be an unreasonable assumption. 
The next meeting was held in April 1990, where again there was no further comment regarding 
the LDC proposals, with the chairman pointedly adding that there had been no discussion 
whatsoever since December 1989.3 Moreover, the Chairman called upon the Secretariat to focus 
on consolidating the existing GATT procedures into a single cohesive text.4 
By mid-July 1990, the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee reported that the “remaining 
issues in [the dispute settlement] area have been identified”5 and that the final draft text should 
be ready by September 1990.6At the meeting of the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement on 
19 July 1990, Bangladesh had requested that the group should give further consideration to its 
proposals and it was agreed that this item should appear on the agenda of the next meeting.7 
The following meeting of the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement took place between the 
24th of September and the 11th of October 1990.8 This was the final meeting of the Negotiating 
Group on Dispute Settlement. At this session of the group there is no mention of the LDC proposal; 
indeed, it was not even on the agenda.9 Moreover, the note of the session confirmed that the 
chairman had submitted an informal text on Dispute Settlement to the Chairman of the Trade 
Negotiations Committee.10 In other words, the committee had agreed upon a final text of what 
was to become the GATT DSU. 
As noted above, elements of some of the proposals put forward by Bangladesh on behalf of the 
LDC were eventually included in the final text of what was to become the DSU.11 However, their 
most radical proposal, that of creating a separate dispute body exclusively for LDCs, appears 
to have been rejected. This rejection met with disapproval from the LDCs, who stated that 
1- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 7 February 1990, 
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/18 (21 Mar. 1990), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNGNG13/18.PDF.
2- Id. at 5.
3- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 5 April 1990, 
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/19 (28 May 1990), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNGNG13/19.PDF.
4-  Id. at 6.
5- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Trade Negotiations Committee, Chairman’s summing-up at meeting of 
26 July 1990, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/15 (30 July 1990), at 4, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/TNC/15.PDF.
6- Id.
7- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 12 July 1990, 
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/21 (19 July 1990), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNGNG13/21.PDF.
8- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 24 September to 
11 October 1990, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/23 (24 Oct. 1990), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNGNG13/23.PDF 
[hereinafter Dispute Settlement Group Fall 1990 Mtg.].
9- Untitled Memorandum from A. Dunkel, Subject: Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, GATT Doc. GATT/
AIR/3095 (19 Sept. 1990), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/GATTAIR/3095.pdf (memorandum setting out agenda for 
Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement meeting).
10- Dispute Settlement Group Fall 1990 Mtg., supra note 199, at 1.
11- Draft Note of Proceedings, supra note 170.
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although some of their concerns had been dealt with, it was “not to the full extent that would 
be desirable.”1
The proposal and the unanimity of the support amongst the LDCs clearly signals that LDCs, as 
a collective, supported the concept that a separate and distinct LDC-only dispute settlement 
system should be put in place. The terms of the proposal clearly show that LDCs fundamentally 
rejected the methodology underpinning the proposed DSU and distanced themselves from it. 
. 4 The “opt out” underpinnings and outcomes
Aside from offering the opt-out proposal, the LDCs provided no information as to how their proposed 
system would function or otherwise be institutionalised. The author opines that any attempt to define 
or describe how such a system would function or be incorporated into the WTO framework would 
be a somewhat pointless exercise in supposition and speculation. That said, the author would also 
argue that the structure and wording of the proposal do give a strong indication as to the rationale 
underpinning the proposal. 
The proposal directed that the settlement of disputes involving LDCs should be determined by a so-
called Group of Five comprised of four chairmen drawn from various GATT committees and bodies 
plus the Director General.2 This approach is indicative of the fact that the LDCs had adopted what 
Jackson describes as “a ‘negotiation’ or ‘diplomacy’ oriented approach”3 where disputes are settled 
through a process of negotiation and compromise.4 By eschewing the detailed “legalistic” provisions 
of the DSU and favouring, instead, a looser framework, the LDCs exhibited what Hudec describes 
as an “antilegalist” viewpoint:5 recourse to dispute resolution by formal adjudication is supplanted 
by “more loosely structured consultation procedures in which governments seek to resolve conflicts 
through negotiation.”6 
At the macro level, the fact that the LDCs unanimously sought the creation of a more relaxed and 
informal bespoke LDC dispute resolution process is in itself strongly reflective of the inculcated and 
long-espoused S&D policy pursued by the LDCs. 
Against this backdrop, the final draft of the DSU, with its clearly-defined, legalistic rules and 
procedures, is effectively the antithesis of the collective wishes of the LDCs. Thus, with the adoption 
of the DSU, the LDCs were left with a dispute system that they neither wanted nor, in a sense, agreed 
to. This, the author argues, is a powerful reason why LDCs do not engage with the DSU. 
As noted above, there has been much academic debate and discourse7 regarding the underlying reasons 
as to why the LDCs have failed to fully use the DSU. This dialogue has produced a bewildering array of 
diverse, yet inter-related and multi-dimensional explanations for what seems an intractable problem.8 
The author contends that in light of the new reason narrated within this paper, these academic 
1- Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Group of Negotiations on Goods, Eighteenth meeting:12 November 
1990, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/25 (19 Nov. 1990), at 3, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNG/25.PDF.
2- See Communication from Bangladesh, supra note 173.
3- John H Jackson, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Policy and Jurisprudential Considerations 1 (Res. Seminar in Int’l Econ., 
Univ. Michigan, Discussion Paper No. 419, 9 Feb. 1998), http://fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers401-425/
r419.pdf.
4- Id.
5- Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 Cornell Int’l L.J. 145, 151 
(1980), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=cilj.
6- Id.
7- See generally sources cited in note 13, supra; Mosoti, supra note 11. 
8- Welsh, supra note 10, at 9.
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arguments need to be re-visited and re-appraised. While brevity does not permit a comprehensive 
analysis to be performed here, this paper will nevertheless seek to briefly re-examine these existing 
explanations, while overlaying this new reason. The author aspires to demonstrate that this approach 
results in revised arguments that collectively produce a comprehensive answer as to why LDCs do not 
engage with the DSU. 
The academic arguments will be grouped as follows:
i. Economic - Due to the small and undiversified nature of LDC economies, they have a limited 
share of world trade and, therefore, disputes are unlikely to arise; 
ii. Complexity - The complexity of the DSU, coupled with a lack legal resources, means the LDCs 
do not have the capacity to effectively engage with the DSU; 
iii. Competence - The LDCs are unable to recognise when a violation of WTO law has occurred; 
iv. Institutional - Structural institutional weaknesses prevent the LDCs from acquiring and 
assimilating the evidence required to support a dispute claim; 
v. Reprisals - A fear of reprisals from potential respondents chills pursuit of dispute claims; 
vi. Costs - The high costs of engaging external legal counsel to conduct a dispute on the behalf of 
an LDC prevents pursuit of claims; 
vii. Enforcement - The perceived inability of an LDC to enforce a respondent’s compliance with a 
favourable ruling discourages pursuit of claims; 
viii. Facilitation - The lack of LDC representation in Geneva, as well as linguistic and communication 
difficulties, discourages pursuit of claims. 
. 4.1 Economic Factors contributing to LDC non-participation
The economic arguments are premised on the facts that the LDCs have low-income economies 
with acute structural weaknesses;1 in particular, they lack diversity in products exported and are 
predominantly primary producers.2 Consequently, the LDCs’ collective share of world trade was 
less than 1 percent of all exports in 2015.3 As a further consequence, very few disputes arise, 
which explains the minimal use of the DSU by LDCs.4 That said, the limited size and diversity 
of LDC economies neither fully explain the limited use of the DSU by LDCs5 nor render them 
immune to the imposition of WTO inconsistent measures. 6 Moreover, statistically, LDCs should 
have initiated more disputes,7 and there appear to be no shortage of prospective cases. 8 
1- See U.N. Dev. Pol’y & Analysis Div., Creation of the LDC Category and Timeline of Changes to LDC Membership and 
Criteria, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/creation-of-the-ldc-category-
and-timeline-of-changes-to-ldc-membership-and-criteria.html (last visited 11 Jan. 2018). 
2- See generally Joan Apecu, The Level of African Engagement at the World Trade Organization from 1995 to 2010, 4.2 Int’l 
Dev. Pol’y | Revue internationale de politique de développement 29 (2013), https://poldev.revues.org/1492; Z. Ntozintle 
Jobodwana, Participation of African member states in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) multilateral trading system, 1 
Intl J. African Renaissance Stud. -- Multi-, Inter- & Transdisciplinarity 244, 253 (2006), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/18186870608529720.
3- Hubert Escaith & Andreas Maurer, World Trade Organisation International Trade Statistics 2016 52 (2016), https://www.
wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2016_e/wts2016_e.pdf.       
4- Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 14, at 21; Joseph F. Francois, Henrik Horn & Niklas Kaunitz, Trading Profiles and 
Developing Country Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 8 (Res. Inst. Indus. Econ. [IFN] Working Paper No. 
730, 1 Oct. 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534766.
5- Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 14, at 22.
6- Bohanes & Garza, supra note 13, at 67.
7- Francois, Horn & Kaunitz, supra note 214, at 47.
8- Mosoti, supra note 11, at 79; Int’l Trade Ctr., Rwanda: Company Perspectives (ITC Series on Non-Tariff Measures, Doc. No. 
MAR-14-242E, 2014), http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/Publications/NTM%20-%20Rwanda%20
Company%20Perspectives_low%20res1.pdf [hereinafter, Int’l Trade Ctr.].
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From this brief summary, it is clear that in solus the economic argument does not fully explain 
why LDCs avoid using the DSU to defend their trade rights. If, however, one considers the concept 
that LDCs also have an aversion to the DSU, created by a dispute resolution system they neither 
wanted nor actually agreed to, then the argument, as a whole, is significantly more robust. This 
argument accords precisely with the new information in this paper. 
. 4.2 The complexity of the DSU mechanism
The WTO is a rules-based organisation.1 Those rules are enshrined in technically complex, lengthy2 
and legally binding agreements such as the DSU, the mechanism that enforces rights.3 The DSU 
employs complex, specialized legal argument, which can include highly detailed and technical 
scientific and economic data.4 In addition to the elaborate set of procedural rules within the DSU 
itself, there is an extensive and continually expanding body of case law.5 
Clearly therefore, so the argument goes, in order to pursue a dispute, specialized legal advocacy 
skills6 are required, along with experts to present and explain any requisite economic, technical, 
and scientific data.7 It is argued that LDC non-engagement with the DSU is the product of a lack 
of indigenous legal and specialist resources.8 This combination limits LDCs from raising trade 
disputes.9 Busch et al argue that this lack of capacity is, in fact, “the main constraint limiting 
their access to dispute settlement.”10
While LDCs may lack specialist “in-house” legal capacity within the trade arena, the DSU contains 
measures to bridge the capacity deficit faced by LDCs11 and offers training courses to build 
capacity.12 Capacity-building courses, seminars and traineeships, specifically designed to address 
this issue, were and continue to be offered by external agencies such as UNCTAD13 and the ACWL.14 
The foregoing demonstrates that the LDCs can access training to acquire the requisite legal 
capacity, It does not fully explain why, with 22 years since the WTO came into existence, LDCs 
still lack in-house capacity. 
1-  World Trade Organization, The WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm (last visited 11 Jan. 2018).
2- Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 14, at 22.
3- World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes--A Unique Contribution, https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited 11 Jan. 2018).
4- Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 14, at 23.
5- Bohanes & Garza, supra note 13, at 70.
6- These skills not only require a detailed working knowledge of the rules of WTO agreements, but also those of the DSU. 
They also require a detailed understanding of a growing body of case law resulting from the 535 disputes filed to date. 
See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: The Disputes—Find Disputes Cases,  <https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm?year=any&subject=none&agreement=none&member1=none&member2=none&c
omplainant1=true&complainant2=true&respondent1=true&respondent2=true&thirdparty1=false&thirdparty2=false#results 
(last visited 11 Jan. 2018).
7- Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 14, at 323.
8- Bohanes & Garza, supra note 13, at 71.
9- Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 14, at 23.
10- Busch, Reinhardt & Shaffer, supra note 13, at 576.
11- DSU, supra note 19, art. 27.2.
12- Id. art. 27.3.
13- Gregory Shaffer, The challenges of WTO law: Strategies for developing country adaptation, 5 World Trade Rev. 177, 183 
(2006) [hereinafter Shaffer, Challenges].
14- Training, ACWL [Advisory Centre on WTO Law], http://www.acwl.ch/training-introduction (last visited 19 March 2016); 
Abbott, supra note 13, at 12.
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Alavi has argued that, for African countries, the DSU rules are “of little or no value…and in fact 
have alienated them from the organisation.” 1   A representative of Bangladesh has spoken of 
“underlying problems in the system,”2 while Bohanes has opined that LDCs would not provide the 
resources to acquire unwanted legal expertise that would never be used.3
At face value, the academic literature does not provide a satisfactory answer to the core question 
as to why LDCs have not, in the period from 1995 to date, taken it upon themselves to acquire 
the legal capacity required to protect their trade rights. 
If, however, the various statements are viewed in light of the LDCs having openly disavowed 
themselves of the DSU, then the answer become self-evident. LDCs lack “in-house” capacity 
simply because there is no need to invest in acquiring legal capacity for a system they will not 
use.
. 4.3 LDCs’ inability to recognise a violation of WTO law
The basis of this argument is that before instigating a DSU dispute, the aggrieved party must (i) 
recognise that its trade rights have been infringed,4 (ii) legally assess the merits of any potential 
complaint,5 and (iii) prepare initial submissions—all of which LDCs lack the capacity to do.6
The academic literature has thoroughly described the challenges that LDCs face in each of these 
areas. Notwithstanding this litany, LDCs have, in fact, identified both potential infractions and 
breaches of WTO law.7 But only one LDC has chosen to pursue and protect its trade rights under 
WTO law.8 Moreover, LDCs who lack either the capacity or the resources to identify potential 
infringements of their trade rights can access assistance from a variety of sources such as the 
ACWL, NGOs, or private companies, resources that “have largely remained underutilised.”9
It has been argued that LDCs are constrained in terms of their capability to amass, understand 
and explain the requisite technical, scientific and economic data10 that may be required to 
successfully pursue or defend a complaint. But the academic literature has also suggested that 
1- Alavi, supra note 13, at 38.
2- World Trade Organization, Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, 1314- Nov. 2003--Minutes of Meeting, TN/
DS/M/14 (20 Apr. 2004), at 7.
3- Jan Bohanes, WTO Dispute Settlement and Industrial Policy 71 (Think Piece, E15 Expert Group on Invigorating Manufacturing: 
New Industrial Policy and the Trade System, Apr. 2015), https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/E15_
NewIndustrialPolicy_Bohanes_FINAL.pdf.
4- Nottage, Developing Countries, supra note 13, at 11.
5- Abbott, supra note 13, at 12-13; Alavi, supra note 13, at 32.
6- Bohanes & Garza, supra note 13, at 79; Alavi, supra note 13, at 32; James Smith, Inequality in International Trade? 
Developing Countries and Institutional Change in WTO Dispute Settlement’ 11 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 542, 543 
(2004).”plainCitation”:”Bohanes and Garza (n 18
7- Mosoti, supra note 11, at 79; Int’l Trade Ctr., supra note 218.
8- World Trade Organization, India-Antidumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh, Request for Consultations by 
Bangladesh, WT/DS306/1 (2 Feb. 2004), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&
CatalogueIdList=56006&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasS
panishRecord=True [hereinafter India-Antidumping Measure].
9- Jumoke Oduwole, Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained? A Case Study of Africa’s Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement’ 
(2009) 2 Int’l J. Priv. L. 358, 367 (2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2119853.
10- Andrea M. Ewart, Small Developing States in the WTO: A Procedural Approach to Special and Differential Treatment 
through Reforms to Dispute Settlement 35 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 27, 40 (2007).
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this lack of resources is primarily driven by governments preferring to allocate resources in other 
areas,1 such as domestic issues.2
It is apparent that LDCs do have resource issues, though some LDCs have demonstrated that they 
can identify WTO non-compliant measures and provide the resources needed to enforce their 
trade rights.3 Other LDCs have opted not to allocate the requisite resources in this area, and 
many LDCs appear unwilling to avail themselves of the assistance and support that are freely 
available. These findings are entirely consistent with the contention here that LDCs have adopted 
a policy that eschews the use of the DSU.
. 4.4 Institutional weaknesses & the acquisition of evidence 
WTO cases are becoming increasingly complicated,4 and WTO members are increasingly reliant on 
economic experts who can correctly frame and emphasize the facts of a given case.5 Ewart argues 
that most developing countries lack the funds and systems to even collect the data required to 
substantiate a WTO complaint.6 
This argument is premised on the fact that LDCs lack the institutional, financial, administrative 
and human resources to acquire and subsequently present economic and scientific data necessary 
to formulate and sustain a successful complaint. 
While there can be little doubt that LDCs do suffer from these maladies, several factors should be 
borne in mind. First, as was noted above under the discussion of economic factors, the range and 
diversity of LDC exports are very limited and mostly comprise primary products. Therefore, the 
range and depth of expert knowledge that may be required will be equally limited. Consequently, 
it would be highly improbable that any case involving an LDC would be anywhere near as complex 
as, for example, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (2006),7 a case that, according 
to Van den Bossche and Gathii, involved over thirty scientific specialisations. 
There could, however, still be a scenario where expertise unavailable in an LDC could be needed 
and would have to be tracked down and funded. Article 27.1 of the DSU8 tasks the Secretariat 
with providing secretarial and technical support.9 While the literature is somewhat unclear as 
to the mechanics of providing such support, Bown argues that the support should extend to the 
1- Shaffer, Challenges, supra note 231, at 185. 
2- Luke Olson, Note, Incentivizing Access to the WTO’s Dispute System for the Least-Developed Countries: Legal Flaws in 
Brazil’s Upland Cotton Decision, 23 Minn. J. Int’l L. 101, 123 (2014).
3- Note: The author will, show, infra, that even in the case of India-Antidumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh, the 
affected industry struggled to force Bangladesh to take any action in the first instance and agreed to underwrite the total 
costs of the dispute.
4- In European Community, Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, European Communities – Measures Affecting 
the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R; WT/DS292/R; WT/DS293/R (2006) over thirty different 
scientific specialisations were referred to by the European Union. See also Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 17, at 23 
[hereinafter EC Biotech Products].
5- C.A. Thomas, Of Facts and Phantoms: Economics, Epistemic Legitimacy, and WTO Dispute Settlement, 14 J. Int’l Econ. L. 
295, 323-24 (2011).
6- Ewart, supra note 242, at 40.
7- See EC Biotech Products, supra note 246.
8-  DSU, supra note 9, at 372.
9- Id.
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provision of technical economic support, 1 while Thomas notes that the Secretariat may be a 
potential source of economic information and advice to the parties.2
Furthermore, LDCs could access and acquire the required skills and technical expertise from 
other non-governmental agencies and bodies, whose submissions, sought by the panels, have 
been used in some 19 disputes.3 Thus NGOs and other organisations, if such bodies are prepared 
to provide assistance, could be a rich source of the requisite technical and scientific expertise.
Additionally, LDCs could access the ACWL Technical Expertise Fund,4 which can be used to assist 
in the acquisition of scientific, economic and other non-legal technical input.5 As Nottage aptly 
states, “The commonly-identified cost and resource constraints, while relevant once, appear to 
have been largely addressed.”6 
In summary, while LDCs may have difficulty in acquiring the technical information to support a 
potential dispute, whether through a lack of in-house resources or the inability to fund external 
experts, nonetheless there are avenues and channels by which this acquisition may be facilitated. 
That LDCs have not done so is, once again, supportive of the argument that LDCs are quite simply 
not interested in using the DSU.
. 4.5 Fear of reprisals by potential respondents
This argument is grounded upon fears that reprisals by a potential respondent to a dispute 
dissuade LDCs from engaging with the DSU. There are two strands to the argument: first, LDCs 
may rely on aid and assistance provided by a potential respondent, which may be compromised 
by raising a trade dispute,7 and second, that initiating a dispute may cause a respondent to deny 
preferential access for LDC exports.8
Van den Bossche and Gathii have noted that while Article 3.10 explicitly states that the use of 
the DSU should not be contentious,9 the political reality is that commencing a trade dispute 
would not be regarded as a “friendly act.”10 Cho has observed that threats of reprisal are 
not overt, positing that they may be veiled and un-published: there is anecdotal information 
demonstrating the “subtle warnings conveyed through diplomatic channels.”11 Mosoti has argued 
1- The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement 392 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn, eds., 2010).
2- Thomas, supra note 247, at 317.
3- See Gabrielle Z. Marceau & Jennifer K Hawkins, Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement, 3 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement 493, 494-95 
(2012), https://academic.oup.com/jids/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/jnlids/ids014.
4-  Technical Expertise Fund, ACWL [Advisory Centre on WTO Law], http://www.acwl.ch/technical-expertise-fund (last visited 
21 March 2016).
5- Nottage, Developing Countries, supra note 13, at 6.
6- Id.
7- Chad P. Bown & Bernard M Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the 
Private Sector, 8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 861, 863 (2005); Christina L. Davis & Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, Who Files? Developing 
Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication 71 J. Pol. 1033, 1035 (2009); Manfred Elsig & Philipp Stucki, Low-income 
developing countries and WTO litigation: Why wake up the sleeping dog?, 19 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 292, 299 (2012).
8- Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 14, at 26; Davis & Bermeo, supra note 258, at 1035; Kevin Watkins, Cultivating 
Poverty: The Impact of US Cotton Subsidies on Africa, in 2 Oxfam Policy and Practice: Agriculture, Food and Land 82, 86 
(2002), http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oxpp/oppafl/2002/00000002/00000001/art00004; 
9-  DSU, supra note 9, art. 3.10. 
10- Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 14, at 26.
11- Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Doha’s Promises: Administrative Barriers as an Obstruction to Development, 25 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 
395, 413 (2007), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol25/iss3/2.
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that subtly threatening to withdraw aid (a tactic which, Mosoti opines, has been effectively used 
in negotiations) acts as an effective barrier to a poor country filing a dispute.1
Substantiating these arguments is, by the nature of the arguments themselves, somewhat difficult. 
They are largely premised upon unrecorded, unwritten oral statements, comments and innuendo, 
all of which makes evaluation of these arguments, at best, subjective—if not simply irrelevant. 
Illustrating this point in relation to the U.S.-Upland Cotton2 dispute, Gross has argued, on the 
one hand, that  there is no evidence of “any threat of reprisal—overt or implicit—by the US”3 but 
has conceded, on the other hand, the possibility that the absence of this evidence may be due to 
the “behind closed doors” nature of trade diplomacy.4 Davis and Bermeo have noted that fears of 
potential diplomatic repercussions proved to be baseless in US Underwear.5 While acknowledging 
that these fears exist, Elsig and Stig cite in counterpoint the case of Chad, whose U.S. foreign 
aid increased despite being a third party in US-Upland Cotton.6  The fear of retaliation was a 
factor considered by Bangladesh before initiating its DSU complaint against India.7 The ministry of 
commerce assessed the likely risks of retaliation and ended up dismissing the risk.8 
While there may be a perception of retaliation risk, in practice there would appear to be little 
evidence of it. Guzman and Simmons provide the strongest rebuttal of these arguments, arguing 
that despite the inequalities between WTO members, “the main problem does not appear to be the 
coercive tactic by the powerful.”9 In any event, Van den Bossche and Gathii have argued that the 
threat of retaliation provides an inadequate explanation for LDC non-engagement with the DSU.10
With no evidence proving either (a) reprisals resulting from initiating or threatening to initiate 
a WTO dispute or (b) concrete examples of threats of reprisals being made either explicitly or 
overtly and with the concept as a whole being effectively discounted by writers,11 this whole line 
of argument is, quite simply, without foundation. 
If one views these arguments through the lens of LDCs actively seeking to avoid engagement 
with the DSU, then a simple construct would be that LDC governments deliberately deploy the 
reprisals argument as part of what Taslim describes as “internal bureaucratic resistance”12 in 
order to further a wider policy-driven agenda of non-engagement with the DSU. 
1- Mosoti, supra note 11, at 80.
2- World Trade Organization, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton; Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/
DS267/46 (23 Oct. 2014), file:///D:/Downloads/267-46.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Upland Cotton].
3- Adam Gross, Can Sub-Saharan African Countries Defend their Trade and Development Interests Effectively in the WTO? The 
Case of Cotton, 18 Eur. J. Developmental Res. 368, 378 (2006).
4- Id.
5- World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, 
WT/DS24/AB/R (10 Feb. 1997). 
6- Elsig & Stucki, supra note 258, at 310; U.S.-Upland Cotton, supra note 267. 
7- See India-Antidumping Measure, supra note 240.
8- Mohammad Ali Taslim, How the DSU worked for Bangladesh: the first least developed country to bring a WTO Claim, in 
Dispute Settlement at the WTO: The Developing Country Experience 230, 244 (Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz 
eds., 2010).
9- Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World 
Trade Organization Disputes, 34 J. Legal Stud. 557, 592 (2005), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3153319/
simmons_powerplays.pdf?sequence=2.
10- Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 14, at 28.
11- Guzman & Simmons, supra note 271.
12- Taslim, supra note 270, at 240.
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. 4.6 Costs – the high costs of engaging external legal counsel 
Until 1997 parties involved in DSU disputes used their own “in-house” lawyers to argue their 
case. In EC-Bananas III1 the Appellate Body directed that parties to a dispute could choose their 
own counsel, such as outside counsel, to represent them, in order to “participate fully in dispute 
settlement proceedings.”2 
At first glance, by allowing countries to engage suitably qualified legal counsel, the Appellate 
Body seems to have removed a potential barrier to LDC engagement: the LDCs’ lack of “in-
house” with the necessary advocacy skills. This removal, however, created two further perceived 
barriers, first, that LDCs could not afford to hire external counsel,3 and second, that even if the 
funding could be found, the quantum of the claim and the economic benefits that might flow from 
winning a dispute might total less than the costs of conducting the dispute in the first place.4 
Again, at face value, these arguments appear to be both strong and robust. However, as Van den 
Bossche and Gathii acknowledge, while the practice is not generally publicised, legal fees for a 
complainant party to a dispute are often borne by the industry directly interested in pursuing 
the dispute, as opposed to being paid by the concerned government itself.5 They point out, 
though, that private funding of legal costs may be inappropriate if the wider political interests 
and policies of the state and those of the industry are misaligned.6 Furthermore, they note that 
in LDCs, a domestic industry “obviously does not have the resources available”7 to fund a case. 
While, for LDCs, funding by a domestic industry may be not in all instances be a practical 
possibility,8 the numbers would shift were the LDC to avail itself of the services of the ACWL. 
Where the ACWL is used to provide legal support and representation to an LDC, the LDC pays 
only 10% of the full cost of the dispute. Estimates as to legal costs vary considerably amongst 
academic writers, with Nordstrom and Shaffer suggesting costs of $321,250 for a simple case and 
up to $882,500 for a complex case.9 Bohanes and Garza suggest that a challenging case including 
1- World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (9 Sept. 1997), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.as
px?language=E&CatalogueIdList=24066&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRec
ord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True.
2- Id. ¶ 12.
3- Richard L Bernal, Participation of Small Developing Economies in the Governance of the Multilateral Trading System 26 
(Centre for International Governance Innovation [CIGI] Working Paper No. 44, Dec. 2009), https://www.cigionline.org/
sites/default/files/participation_of_sde_in_the_governance_of_the_multilateral_trading_system.pdf [hereinafter Bernal, 
Participation]; Abbott, supra note 13, at 11; Bohanes & Garza, supra note 13, at 71.
4- Bruce A. Blonigen & Chad P. Bown, Antidumping and Retaliation Threats, 60 J. Int’l Econ. 249, 253 (2003); Marco Bronckers 
& Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 
Journal of International Economic Law 101, 106 (2005); Busch, Reinhardt & Shaffer, supra note 18, at 10; Cho, supra note 
381, at 412 (citing The World Bank, Global Economic  Prospects 2004: Realizing the Development Promise of the DOHA 
Agenda 116 (2003), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRGEP2004/Resources/gep2004fulltext.pdf); Anne-Célia Disdier 
& Lionel Fontagné, Trade impact of European measures on GMOs condemned by the WTO panel, 146 Rev. World Econ. 495, 
22 (2010); Bown & Hoekman, supra note 258, at 863, 865.
5- Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 14, at 24.
6- Id. at 24-25. Note: If one expands this point to include a scenario where an LDC was pursuing a policy of DSU non-
engagement, then even in the unlikely event of the domestic industry being able to fund an action, this funding would 
probably be declined.
7- Id. at 24.
8- Taslim, supra note 270, at 242.
9- Nordström & Shaffer, supra note 13, at 600.
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an appeal would cost in the region of $1 million,1 and Shaffer notes that a firm quoted $200,000 
for a small case conducted through the panel stage of the DSU.2 Taslim notes that Bangladesh 
was advised that the cost of an anti-dumping trade dispute would total $150,000, which meant 
that if it engaged the services of the ACWL, the Bangladesh government would only expect to pay 
10% thereof, i.e., $15,000,3 despite already having received an undertaking from the domestic 
producer to bear all financial costs of the DSU process.4
In summary, neither access to legal representation nor its cost should, in practice, act as a 
barrier to LDC engagement with the DSU. There are no financial barriers to obtaining an initial 
assessment of a potential case: the ACWL provides legal opinions for free.5 The obstacle imposed 
by the high legal costs of pursuing a dispute have largely been “overcome” by the existence of 
the ACWL.6 LDCs can also address legal capacity concerns by drawing on the ACWL.7 Scholars have 
cautioned, though, that while the ACWL provides legal capacity, governments must nevertheless 
engage with the ACWL and there is, as a study has shown, a lack of continuity in this regard.8 
The academic literature demonstrates that LDCs could access the ACWL, which offers them 
qualified legal counsel to conduct a trade dispute from inception to conclusion for as little as 
$15,000.9 Notwithstanding this paltry sum, the literature has shown that certain African countries 
would not even consider engaging with the DSU unless legal services were provided completely 
free of charge.10 This counterintuitive position can only be rationally explained by the wider 
narrative of LDCs refusing to accept or be associated with the DSU. In this light, any litigation 
costs, no matter how insignificant, would be objectionable and, consequently, used to re-enforce 
a policy of non-engagement with the DSU.
. 4.7 LDC enforcement of a favourable ruling 
Article 19 of the DSU states that when a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, the 
member responsible will bring the measure into conformity with the covered agreement.11 In 
the event of non-compliance with Article 19, the complainant may take retaliatory measures12 
equivalent to the economic harm and loss in trade benefits caused.13
1- Bohanes & Garza, supra note 13, at 71.
2- Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing 
Country Strategies 16 (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development [ICTSD)] 2003), <http://mercury.ethz.
ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/92860/ichaptersection_singledocument/6fc9b1ec-ade2-4df3-9862-2a7516fefad4/en/No_05_
chapter_1_+Towards_a_Development_.pdf> accessed 26 March 2016.
3- For an exception to this see Taslim, supra note 270, at 242.
4- Id.
5- Bohanes & Garza, supra note 13, at 71.
6- Chad P. Bown & Rachel McCulloch, Developing Countries, Dispute Settlement, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, 19 J. 
Int’l Trade & Econ. Dev. 33, 36 (2010), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09638190903327468?scroll=top&ne
edAccess=true.  
7- Elsig & Stucki, supra note 377, at 297; Mosoti, supra note 15, at 79.
8- Busch, Reinhardt and Shaffer, supra note 13, at 574.
9- Taslim, supra note 270, at 242.
10- Edwini Kessie & Kofi Addo, African Countries and the WTO Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding 20 (Int’l 
Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. [ICTSD] 2007), http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2008/05/african-countries-and-the-
wto-negotiations-on-the-dispute-settlement-understanding.pdf.
11- DSU, supra note 9, art. 19.1.
12- Note: These must be approved by the DSB. Id., art. 22.4.
13- Id. 
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Anderson argues that LDCs lack the capacity to retaliate, speaking of the “inherent injustice of 
retaliation,”1 and Apecu argues that African countries have neither the leverage nor a sufficiently 
wide product base to give them viable “alternatives for retaliation.”2 Bartels, Bown and Hoekman 
argue that the ineffective nature of retaliatory measures may cause certain countries simply not 
to initiate disputes in the first instance.3 
While the literature has stressed that enforcement issues are a concern, there are very high 
compliance rates within the wider context of the DSU as a whole. Davey has suggested a 
compliance rate of 83%.4  The literature has also shown that in almost all WTO disputes where 
a violation has occurred, the respondent country brings itself into compliance.5 Meagher has 
gone further, arguing that, given the infrequent use of counter-measures, the extent to which 
enforcement problems affect DSU participation is questionable.6 Moreover, in the only case to 
date brought by an LDC,7 the disputants reached a mutually agreeable solution.8
Academics have explored the influence of “soft law” within the context of enforcement: the 
phenomenon that an adverse ruling places economic and political pressure on a government to 
comply, making it easier for governments to settle their disputes. 9 In this vein, Van den Bossche 
and Gathii have suggested that LDCs should harness the potential of naming and shaming violators.10 
The analysis here could suggest that if LDCs were faced with a recalcitrant and obstinate 
respondent, they could face difficulties enforcing a decision. However, that argument must be 
analysed against a backdrop of (i) the high levels of respondent compliancy, (ii) the fact that 
recourse to the use of reprisals has been very limited and (iii) the availability of “soft law” as 
a useful alternative strategy that LDCs could employ. With the addition of the evidence in this 
paper that LDCs have an intrinsic antagonism towards engaging with the DSU, the argument that 
LDC non-engagement with the DSU results from their inability to enforce a favourable ruling 
crumbles. In fact, the new rationale advanced in this paper may indeed be the pre-eminent 
factor explaining LDC non-engagement with the DSU. 
. 4.8 Lack of a mission in Geneva & linguistic difficulties 
It has been argued that having a diplomatic mission in Geneva is of key importance to the pursuit 
of a country’s national interest at the WTO.11 Many small countries either do not have a permanent 
1- Kym Anderson, Peculiarities of retaliation in WTO dispute settlement, 1 World Trade Rev. 123, 129 (2002), https://digital.
library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/2287/1/Anderson_2287.pdf.
2- Apecu, supra note 212, at 26. 
3- Lorand Bartels, Making WTO Dispute Settlement Work for African Countries: An Evaluation of Current Proposals for 
Reforming the DSU, 6 L. & Dev. Rev. 47, 49 (2013); Bown & Hoekman, supra note 377, at 863.
4- William J. Davey, The WTO dispute settlement system: The first ten years, 8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 17, 47 (2005).
5- Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. Int’l 
Econ. L. 397, 399 (2007), http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/2/397.
6- Niall Meagher, Representing Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, in WTO Law, supra note 42, at 
223.
7- See India-Antidumping Measure, supra note 240.
8- World Trade Organization, India-Antidumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh, Notification of Mutually Satisfactory 
Solution, WT/DS306/3 G/L/669/Add1 G/ADP/D52/2 (23 Feb. 2006), file:///D:/Downloads/D52-2.pdf.
9- Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law Enforcement 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
102, 154 (2011-12), http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/80-1-Brewster.pdf.
10- Van den Bossche & Gathii, supra note 14, at 29.
11- Richard Blackhurst, Bill Lyakurwa & Ademola Oyejide, Options for Improving Africa’s Participation in the WTO, 23 World 
Econ. 491, 493 (2000).  
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diplomatic mission to the WTO in Geneva,1 or they have a mission staffed by diplomats rather 
than specialist personnel who understand the DSU. Aspects of this situation may explain, in part, 
LDC non-engagement with the DSU, but the picture is more complex than it appears.2 
Concerning the presence of missions in Geneva, Apecu has noted that in 1995 only one half of 
all African countries had permanent representatives at the WTO.3 This number rose steadily over 
the years: 68% by 2001, 80% by 2005 and over 92% by 2010.4 By 2014, more than 91% of the LDC 
members of the WTO had permanent missions in Geneva, with only Gambia, Malawi and Vanuatu 
lacking one. 
However, despite the increase in the number of missions and, therefore, staff, LDC engagement 
with the DSU has remained low.5 The composition of the missions in terms of staffing by 
experienced legal personnel is not clear. There is evidence to suggest that for many African 
countries the primary areas of focus for their WTO missions are trade facilitation and commerce,6 
leaving dispute resolution and the associated need for trained and experienced personnel as, 
at best, tertiary considerations. This evidence as to non-juridical focus again accords with the 
argument that LDCs inherently have little or no interest in the DSU.
Another argument posits that LDC personnel within missions lack the language skills needed 
to deal with dispute panels and an appellate body whose proceedings are in English,7 as well 
as panellists whose common language is usually English.8 Because the WTO offers technical 
training support in language skills to members,9 and certified translation services are also widely 
available,10 LDCs could ameliorate these difficulties.
A third argument proposes that wider engagement by LDCs has been hampered by a combination 
of a lack of support from and poor internal communication between, national governments, 
governmental departments, and key government officials and their respective WTO missions.11 In 
this regard, the literature demonstrates that communications difficulties are not per se an issue 
that exclusively affects LDCs. The literature talks about the ineffective and incoherent written 
communications and a lack of clear guidance from capitals.12 The literature also suggests that 
poor levels of communication were not universally an issue for all LDCs, some of whom had “tight 
Geneva-capital coordination and support.”13 
1- Richard L. Bernal, Small Developing Economies in the World Trade Organization, 13 Paper Presented at World Bank 
Conference “Leveraging Trade, Global Market Integration and the New WTO Negotiations for Development,” Washington, 
D.C. (July 23-24, 2001). 
2- Gross, supra note 384, at 371; Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and 
Surveillance, 23 World Econ. 527, 535 (2000).
3- Apecu, supra note 212, at 6.
4-  Id. at 40.
5-  Id. at 6.
6- Id. at 7. 
7- Abbott, supra note 13, at 11.
8- Id. at 18.
9- ‘World Trade Organization, TRTA: Trade-Related Technical Assistance--Technical assistance and training courses for 2016-
2017, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/train_e/course_details_e.htm (last visited 11 Jan. 2018).
10- See, e.g., Certified Translation, Morningside Translations, https://www.morningtrans.com/services/translations/
certified-translations (last visited 26 Oct. 2017).
11- Apecu, supra note 212, at 7. 
12- Busch, Reinhardt and Shaffer, supra note 13, at 573.
13- Apecu, supra note 212, at 29.
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The academic literature relating to these issues paints a mixed and somewhat incoherent picture, 
one from which it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions as to the limiting effect they may have 
on the ability of LDCs to successfully pursue a trade dispute.  However, an example may enable an 
evaluation of the significance and effect of having a properly staffed, fully resourced, permanent 
mission on a country’s ability to use the DSU to successfully initiate and conduct trade litigation.
In United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,1 
neither Antigua nor Barbuda had a mission in Geneva,2 but they nonetheless successfully initiated3 
and won a trade dispute against the United States in a case that involved not only panel,4 arbitral5 
and Appellate Body proceedings,6 but also compliance proceedings.7  This simple illustration 
shows that the lack of a fully staffed, permanent mission does not preclude a WTO member 
from pursuing a trade dispute. If LDCs so desired, they could fully engage with the DSU with or 
without the need for representation in Geneva. This lack of desire is, as with so many of the non-
engagement situations addressed in this paper, driven by the fact that LDCs have chosen simply 
to ignore the DSU as a means for protecting or enforcing their trade rights. 
1- World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, DS285: United States--Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm (last visited 11 
Jan. 2018); see also Douglas A. Irwin & Joseph Weiler, Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services (DS 285) 7 World Trade Rev. 71 (2008). 
2- World Trade Organization, Development: Geneva Week, WTO organizes “Geneva Weeks” for non-resident delegations, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/genwk_e.htm (last visited 11 Jan. 2018).
3- World Trade Organization, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/1 (27 March 2003) - https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/
FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=1639&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishR
ecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True.
4- Id. Report of the Panel, WT/DS285/R (10 Nov. 2004), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?l
anguage=E&CatalogueIdList=73463&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord
=True&HasSpanishRecord=True.
5- Id. Arbitration under Article 213(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes - 
Award of the Arbiter, WT/DS285/13 (19 Aug. 2005) https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?lan
guage=E&CatalogueIdList=47161&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=T
rue&HasSpanishRecord=True.
6- Id. Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS285/AB/R (7 Apr. 2005), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_
S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=47161&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&H
asFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True; Corrigendum, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=77750,57247&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&H
asFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True.
7- Id. Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 222 of the DSU; United States, WT/DS285/22 (22 June 2007), https://docs.
wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=116359,113791,80129,77750,81730,817
22,81492,82694,60022,72047&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=6&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True
&HasSpanishRecord=True; Id. Communication from Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/26 (25 Apr. 2013), https://docs.wto.
org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=116359,113791,80129,77750,81730,81722,8
1492,82694,60022,72047&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&Ha
sSpanishRecord=True; Id. Recourse to Article 215 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda - Report of the Panel, WT/DS285/RW 
(30 Mar. 2007), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=116359,1
13791,80129,77750,81730,81722,81492,82694,60022,72047&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=8&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord
=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True. 
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Conclusion  
The first section of this paper critically analysed the term S&D and the factors underpinning the same, and 
explored how the S&D principles evolved and were embedded into the legal framework of the GATT.
In the second section, the paper considered how S&D evolved from a mechanism designed to take account 
of purely economic issues arising out of trade negotiations. The section evinced how S&D expanded into 
a broader policy tool adopted and deployed by LDCs to address an ever-expanding set of non-economic 
issues. Moreover, the analysis showed that S&D came to be the dominant force that drove LDC trade 
policies within the GATT, an aspect which has thus far not been discussed within the academic literature. 
The third section focused upon the Uruguay Round and specifically on the negotiations the led up to 
the creation of the DSU. It demonstrated the fact that S&D was a key driver not only in terms of LDC 
policies, but also in terms of LDC negotiation objectives and strategies. The section illustrated how the 
LDCs strove for and secured a platform within the GATT from which they could formulate and share S&D 
policy objectives, draft and agree upon S&D-driven proposals and, as a pressure group, advance their S&D 
objectives with the other GATT bodies and negotiating groups. 
The third section explored the role played by the LDCs in the formulation of what was to become the DSU. 
In these negotiations, LDCs again pursued, with some limited success, their S&D policies through the aegis 
of specific proposals. As these negotiations were reaching a critical phase, when the key Negotiating Group 
was beginning to focus on agreeing on a draft text, the LDCs submitted a radical proposal, supported by 
and premised upon S&D. This proposal provided, inter alia, for the creation of a separate, distinct and 
bespoke dispute settlement system, which would sit outside of the GATT Dispute Settlement regime. This 
opt-out proposal has hitherto never been examined by academic writers and thus represents a further 
contribution to the body of academic knowledge. 
The fourth section explored the underpinnings of the opt-out proposal, positing that the rejection of their 
S&D-based proposal left the LDCs with an unwanted dispute settlement system. This rejection has led 
LDCs to distance themselves from engagement with the DSU. This, the author argues, provides a powerful 
and compelling explanation for LDC non-engagement with the DSU.
The fourth section then proceeded to apply this new reason to the existing academic arguments 
demonstrating that this new explanation not only represents a unique perspective on the topic but may 
also provide a particularly powerful reason why LDCs have not more actively engaged with the DSU. In 
the opinion of the author, these findings not only add to the general debate as to why LDCs do not engage 
with the DSU, but also mean that the existing academic arguments, reasons, and rationale require a full 
re-evaluation. 
Turning now to look to the future, it is difficult to envisage a situation where the WTO membership would 
look favourably at any attempt by the LDCs to resurrect their proposal for the creation of a bespoke LDC-
only dispute settlement system. 
The DSU, which incorporated what were at the time “state of the art” provisions,1 has received widespread 
acclaim, often being described as the crown jewel of the WTO system.2 Additionally, in his highly-regarded 
report,3 Peter Sutherland opined that when considering reform of the DSU, “an important underlying 
concern is…not ‘to do any harm’ to the existing system since it has so many attributes.”4
1- Susan Esserman & Robert Howse, WTO on Trial, 82 Foreign Aff. 130, 131 (2003).
2- Id.; Adam Gross, Can Sub-Saharan African Countries Defend Their Trade and Development Interests Effectively in the WTO? 
The Case of Cotton, 18 Eur. J. Development Res. 368, 369, 386 (2006).
3- Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing 
Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium (2004) (Peter Sutherland, Chair), https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf.
4- Id.
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Against this backdrop it is hardly surprising that attempts to reform the DSU have been painfully slow. In 2001 
at Doha, ministers agreed “to negotiations on improvements and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding,”1 and created a body2 tasked with formulating changes to the dispute settlement regime.3 
Jo and Namgung note that the DSU reform process has largely failed to make significant progress since 
it was established.4 In its most recent report5 while the Chairman was convinced that results would 
be forthcoming,6 he conceded that this outlook was predicated upon members being “prepared to be 
realistic; concentrate on what is doable; and be open to delivering results through incremental steps.”7
In practical terms, the creation of an LDC-only, parallel dispute settlement system would be a substantial 
undertaking, fraught with difficulties. Given the paucity of information given by the LDCs as to how such 
a system was originally intended to function, considerable time and effort would have to be expended 
just to formalise the procedural aspects alone. Whether this would be either realistic or doable is open to 
significant doubt. Moreover, each member country, as well as the WTO secretariat, would have to retrain 
personnel and/or engage new personnel who are familiar with the detailed workings of the DSU in order 
to engage with a new system. All of this would involve considerable expenditure that in today’s straitened 
economic times may again be neither realistic nor doable. 
Even this brief analysis demonstrates the quantum of the work that would be required simply to begin the 
process of designing and operating a bespoke dispute settlement system. Given the harmful and disruptive 
effects as well as the difficulties relating to the implementation of even the most rudimentary procedural 
aspects of an alternative DSU, resurrecting the LDC proposal would, in addition to running contrary to the 
Sutherland report, be neither realistic nor doable.
The DSU is recognized as an efficient and generally effective method for settling a variety of international 
trade disputes,8 though one scarcely used by LDC’s. While the failure of LDCs to seek remediation of 
infringements through engagement with the DSU affects their ability to trade internationally and thus 
their economic development,9 the purpose of this paper is not to seek answers as to how this situation 
can be remedied. The author has previously recognised that “[t]here is no ‘silver bullet’ that would, at a 
stroke, correct all of these problems.”10  While this may well be true, the author contends that solving the 
conundrum of LDC engagement with the DSU will only be possible when there is a clear understanding of 
all the contributory causal factors that lie at the root of the non-engagement conundrum.
The identification in this paper of a hitherto unknown causal factor is a crucial missing link in our 
understanding of LDC non-engagement with the DSU. The author offers this new factor to complete our 
understanding of this conundrum and in the hope that, now, solutions will be found and implemented. 
1- William J. Davey, Reforming WTO Dispute Settlement 9 (Ill. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Papers Series, Draft Research Paper 
No. 04-01, 29 Jan. 2004), http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/DAVEY_Reforming-WTO-Dispute-Settlement.pdf 
(last visited 11 Jan. 2018).
2- Note: This body is called the “Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body.”
3- Bernal, Participation, supra note 277, at 10–11. 
4- Hyeran Jo & Hyun Namgung, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Preferential Trade Agreements: Democracy, Boilerplates, 
and the Multilateral Trade Regime, 56 J. Conflict Resol. 1041, 1049 (2012).
5- World Trade Organization, Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Dr Stephen 
Ndungu Karau, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/DS/29 (2 May 2017).
6- Id. at 7.
7- Id.
8- Dan Sarooshi, The Future of the WTO and Its Dispute Settlement System, 2 Int’l Orgs. L. Rev. 129, 129 (2005).
9- See Welsh, supra note 10, at 8.
10- Id. at 46. 
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